It seems increasingly evident that the White House rushed into war with Iran without fully considering the potential consequences. That is all the more reason to hasten the conflict’s end.
After nearly three weeks of fighting, the US is reaching the limits of what air power can accomplish. Although US and Israeli strikes have destroyed thousands of military targets and killed dozens of top officials, including Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the regime remains unbowed. Its drone and missile attacks on neighboring countries and on container ships hoping to transit the Strait of Hormuz have paralyzed the Gulf region. Oil prices are surging; industries from agriculture to semiconductors fear shortages of key inputs. Inflation worries are spreading.
Expanding airstrikes seems more likely to increase collateral damage and turn the population against the West than to break the regime. Replacing the government — now said to be led by Khamenei’s equally hard-line son, Mojtaba — would require tens if not hundreds of thousands of US troops. Even narrower ground missions such as seizing the more than 440 kilograms of near-weapons-grade uranium thought to be buried under Iranian nuclear facilities, capturing the Kharg Island oil export hub or occupying swathes of the coastline in order to protect shipping would dramatically raise the odds of another Middle East quagmire. Worryingly, a Marine expeditionary unit is reportedly now headed for the region.
The White House has a better option: Declare victory and de-escalate. It has already laid the groundwork for such a pivot. After the president demanded “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” and veto power over Iran’s new leaders on March 6, his administration has mostly emphasized more achievable goals: degrading Iran’s ballistic missile stockpiles, launchers and production capacity; sinking its regular navy; and setting back its nuclear program. By those criteria, the president is not entirely crazy to claim: “We’ve won.”
Critics argue the US cannot afford to leave the job half done. Iran retains enough highly enriched uranium to make at least 10 bombs, although the state of the rest of its nuclear infrastructure is unclear. Security forces, although weakened, remain strong enough to suppress dissent. The regime could rebuild its drone arsenal at relatively low cost. Most important, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) likely retains enough anti-ship missiles, drones and sea mines to close off the strait when it chooses, effectively holding its Gulf neighbors and the global economy hostage.
Yet those risks must be weighed against the alternatives. The US and Israel are unlikely to find and hit every last mobile missile launcher, nuclear centrifuge or IRGC commander even with several more weeks of bombing. Meanwhile, the costs of continued airstrikes are not negligible. The Pentagon spent more than US$11 billion in just the first six days of the campaign. Ships, planes, troops and air-defense batteries have been diverted from other theaters, alarming allies. The fighting is depleting supplies of hard-to-replace interceptors and long-range missiles, which are critical to deterring China.
More to the point, the threat has arguably been contained. Although Iran’s leaders would no doubt declare victory when the US ceases hostilities, the regime has been gravely wounded. It would need time and money to rebuild its military capabilities, let alone its devastated proxy network. Meanwhile, it would face abiding hostility from its neighbors and from its own citizens. Sanctions would continue to strangle Iran’s economy while its skies would remain exposed to US or Israeli strikes.
Unless the US has more high-value targets to hit that would further degrade Iran’s nuclear program, the White House should bring this campaign to a close, making sure the regime knows that conflict could resume if Iran interferes with shipping or initiates any attacks, and that any sanctions relief would have to await a credible nuclear deal. In its own Mideast misadventure, a previous US administration declared “mission accomplished” too quickly. This one would be wise not to delay too long.
The Editorial Board publishes the views of the editors across a range of national and global affairs.
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