A weekend appearance by Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) at Tokyo Dome, where he cheered on his nation’s team at the World Baseball Classic, has created a geopolitical storm. Yet, the real significance of this match lies beyond the stadium. It is a signal that Tokyo and Taipei are testing how much Beijing can practically control their engagement.
Cho’s presence was notable: He is the first sitting Taiwanese premier to visit Japan since 1972, when Tokyo severed diplomatic ties with Taipei and recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government.
Beijing responded sharply to Cho’s trip, accusing him of taking part in provocative schemes to further Taiwan’s independence. It warned Tokyo that it would pay a price for indulging in what it described as a provocation.
The visit was no major diplomatic breakthrough between Japan and Taiwan, but neither was it simply a baseball game. Cho’s trip was framed as private and low-key, and involved no official meetings with Japanese counterparts. Even though carefully managed, it marks a departure from years of extreme caution. Governments from Manila to Canberra would be watching closely to assess how far Beijing’s objections still constrain engagement with Taipei. If the costs prove manageable for Japan, others could draw similar conclusions.
Whether orchestrated or incidental, the premier’s appearance in the stadium was astute. China still has options to respond, but heavy retaliation over a sporting event risks looking disproportionate. Baseball carries deep cultural resonance in Taiwan and Japan, a legacy of Tokyo’s colonial rule of the nation from 1895 to 1945 that has evolved into a shared passion.
Cho was not ushered in secretly — he appeared publicly, pictured wearing a “Team Taiwan” cap. The nation is typically required to compete internationally under the name “Chinese Taipei,” as it is not diplomatically recognized by most countries. The symbolism of a Taiwanese official — the government’s third-most senior — openly supporting his team abroad might be subtle, but identity lies at the heart of the cross-strait dispute, where the idea of what it means to be Taiwanese rather than Chinese has strengthened in recent years.
“Beijing’s heavy handedness is backfiring,” said Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. “If China punishes regardless of whatever you do, then why exercise restraint? When the message is always that others are wrong, it becomes less persuasive.”
To be clear, nothing fundamental has changed. Japan still maintains the “one China” policy (where the US and other nations recognize, and have formal ties with, China rather than Taiwan), while holding private and regional exchanges with Taiwan. However, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has sharpened her government’s position on Taiwan recently. Last year, she told parliament that if military force were to be used in any Taiwan conflict, it could be considered a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan — explicitly linking their security to each other.
China reacted with both words and measures. It issued formal protests and travel advisories, discouraged tourism to Japan, tightened import and export controls on some products and imposed restrictions affecting at least 20 Japanese companies. The message from Beijing was clear: Closer alignment with Taipei could hurt.
Beijing bristles at any elevation of Taiwan’s diplomatic status and has spent years peeling away formal allies, leaving Taipei with only 11. The strategy has proved effective in the past, but might be approaching its limits with Japan, a country of particular strategic importance for China. As a key US ally situated close to Taiwan and one of the region’s most influential economic and security actors, Tokyo is recalibrating its position. Taiwanese leaders have occasionally visited Japan in unofficial capacities before. In 2022, William Lai (賴清德) — now president — traveled there to pay respects at the memorial of assassinated former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Such trips have routinely drawn strong protests from China.
Japanese policymakers might reasonably ask whether friction is the new baseline for relations with Beijing. Standing up to China also plays well at home for Takaichi, as her recent election triumph has demonstrated. Japan could slowly normalize these sorts of visits, mirroring Washington’s approach, which frames them as unofficial to limit tensions with the mainland.
That does not mean Beijing lacks leverage. It still has outsized economic influence, and regularly uses trade as a political weapon. It can also escalate military activities as it has frequently done around the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea, where it disputes territory with Tokyo.
A recent lull in Chinese People’s Liberation Army activity around Taiwan should not be interpreted as de-escalation. Instead, it could be the sign of a more intense campaign in the future. Taipei’s officials have linked the drop-off to an expected meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and US President Donald Trump later this month, when the nation is likely to be discussed.
Cho’s visit did not alter Japanese policy or change Taiwan’s status, but it pushed against China’s red lines. In the contest over Taipei’s fate, even small plays matter — and this one should be chalked up as a win.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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