Last month, amid doubts about her eligibility to serve as a public servant, Li Zhenxiu (李貞秀) was sworn into office as a legislator-at-large for the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The ceremony, which followed certification by the Central Election Commission (CEC), was thought to be the end of the controversy. After all, Taiwan is perceived to be governed by the rule of law. While that perception is increasingly valid, it is easy to forget how recently the nation emerged from an authoritarian regime and martial law. Laws are more clearly defined, and are better enforced and subject to oversight than in the past.
In Li’s case, her status was initially not clearly defined, but scrutiny showed it fell short of legal requirements. If the TPP were responsible, it would not appeal on the grounds of a lack of former legal clarity, but should allow the case to be used to improve clarity.
Li was born in China and has lived in Taiwan for more than three decades, marrying a Taiwanese in 1999. She says she loves Taiwan and the Republic of China (ROC), and has sworn an oath of loyalty in front of grand justices. She says that she submitted her application to the authorities in her hometown to renounce her People’s Republic of China (PRC) citizenship, but that the application was rejected.
This should come as a surprise to nobody, especially since the reason for renouncing it was to assume ROC citizenship, while the PRC not only refuses to recognize the existence of the ROC, but also takes great pains to persuade the rest of the world that the ROC does not exist.
The question of whether Li can be believed, that she “loves Taiwan,” or that she is loyal to the ROC is beside the point. It is unfortunate that the PRC rejected her renunciation of citizenship, but the law in Taiwan is clear, whether it be Article 21 of the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例), which stipulates that Chinese nationals can run for or hold public office in Taiwan after holding a household registration in Taiwan for 10 years, and that this 10-year period begins after they submit proof of renouncing their Chinese residency, or Article 20 of the Nationality Act (國籍法), which prohibits people who hold dual nationality from serving in public office.
Remonstrations that the legal requirements are unfair in Li’s case, given her attempt to renounce her citizenship and her avowal of loyalty to the nation, are irrelevant, as the law must be applied universally if it is to be fair. It cannot be applied to individual cases, or depending on the whims of a political party.
The TPP believes that Li deserves an exception, and could rightly point to the CEC’s certification. However, it is worth asking why it insists on Li’s nomination, instead of settling on a less controversial choice, as she was not directly elected. It is also worth asking how the CEC certified her, given the legal questions.
On Tuesday, the CEC announced that it plans to file a lawsuit to question the legality of Li’s election, saying that it was unable to verify her lack of qualification to run in 2023, as it only reviewed her national ID and household registration data, which do not state whether a candidate has renounced Chinese citizenship. This is an absurd excuse, but goes back to the former lack of legal clarity and failure of interdepartmental communication.
The CEC also said that it would resolve the case when a full committee can be convened, which is currently impossible, as it only has four sitting members and needs at least five to convene a session.
A vote on new nominees is slated for Friday next week, and if those nominees are rejected the case “will revert to the Nationality Act,” presumably meaning that Li’s qualification to serve would be declared invalid.
On Friday, Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng (邱垂正) said that the legal loopholes plaguing Li’s case would be closed in anticipation of the nine-in-one elections in November.
Finally, there might be some legal clarity on the issue.
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