Last month’s general election in Japan ended in a sweeping victory for Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which achieved an absolute two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives, a milestone unprecedented for any Japanese political party since World War II.
Shortly after the landslide win, Takaichi pledged to push for a comprehensive restructuring of the national security apparatus, including the establishment of a new National Intelligence Agency, a significant increase in defense spending and a further relaxation of restrictions on military equipment exports. She also vowed to update Japan’s three core security documents — the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program.
Tokyo’s expanding military posture is likely to heighten Beijing’s skepticism, but mounting tensions with China would likely consolidate domestic support for Takaichi’s security ambitions.
The Taiwan issue has emerged as a serious concern. First, this stems from Taiwan’s vulnerable and strategic location — sitting at the intersection of the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Second, the importance of the democratic nation is embedded in the deep-seated fear that if China unifies with Taiwan, the balance of power in East Asia could shift irreversibly.
Should China’s power go unchecked, the hegemon could secure sufficient economic and military power to upend the liberal international order. That scenario would be deeply troubling for regional democracies such as Japan and Taiwan.
In November last year, Takaichi said Tokyo could consider military intervention if Beijing were to use force against Taiwan. Her hardline stance on China helped her secure approval ratings of about 70 percent — a rare level for Japanese leaders in recent years, although support for the LDP itself remained modest.
This surge in public support might explain why, after winning, Takaichi continued to deliver rhetoric against China. In her first speech to the Japanese Diet on Feb. 20, Takaichi warned of China’s increasing “coercion.”
However, Takaichi’s anti-China stance might not last too long. Within hours of her electoral triumph, Takaichi signaled a more conciliatory stance toward Beijing by affirming that Japan “is open to dialogue with China.”
In her remarks, Takaichi underlined that she would seek “understanding” from neighboring countries before considering a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, a site deemed controversial for leaders in China and South Korea. Her remarks seemed to indicate a nuanced effort to de-escalate tensions with neighbors.
This degree of leniency is understandable, as China still has considerable leverage to pressure Japan. On Tuesday last week, Beijing prohibited the export of dual-use items (including seven types of rare earths and related materials) to Japanese entities that it claimed supplied Japan’s military.
With no urgent election pressure (at least until 2028), Takaichi has the political clout to pursue a realistic and flexible China policy. Even so, her conservative stance would most certainly keep Japan’s ties with China strained throughout her term, and this might not sit well with Taiwan.
When tensions between Japan and China flared up in November last year, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) quickly voiced its support for Japan. A group of DPP lawmakers in Kaohsiung urged the public to step up purchases of Japanese goods and travel there as a gesture of solidarity.
President William Lai (賴清德) posted a photo of himself having lunch with sushi made from imported Japanese fish. This move was seen as a deliberate echo of a previous gesture by former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, who had enjoyed Taiwanese pineapples in response to China’s import ban.
Yet, behind these displays of support, there was still a degree of caution. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Chih-chung (吳志中) said Takaichi’s statement should not be interpreted as a direct commitment to defending Taiwan militarily.
As international politics prioritizes national interests over moral alignment, the possibility of Japan intervening militarily to support Taiwan in case of a Chinese invasion is unlikely. In the same vein, speculation about a quasi-military alliance between Taiwan and Japan, or Taiwan being integrated into the US-Japan security structure, appears somewhat optimistic.
As for Chinese leaders, Takaichi’s public statements might have reinforced their perception that Tokyo is crossing Beijing’s “red line.” If Takaichi maintains a hardline stance toward China or pursues policies that deepen ties with Taipei, Beijing would likely intensify pressure on Tokyo while hastening coercive measures to advance unification with Taiwan. Thus, Japan’s assertive stance toward China during Takaichi’s tenure might not bode well for Taiwan.
Taipei finds itself in a delicate bind. As Takaichi presses ahead with an assertive defense agenda and embraces the “China effect” to bolster domestic support, the Lai administration still needs to demonstrate support for Tokyo, as this aligns with the DPP’s stance on defending Taiwanese sovereignty and enhancing ties with democratic partners, notably Japan.
However, the government should exercise caution, as any moves to enhance ties with Japan on the defense front might invite criticism from the main opposition party, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT).
In November last year, KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) accused Lai of “adding fuel to the fire” of the conflict between Japan and China, thereby increasing the risk of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. As the KMT has said that the incumbent administration was pushing Taiwan closer to war with China, stronger ties with Japan might be interpreted by the KMT as provocative and unnecessary actions that would undermine the nation’s security.
Despite a potential backlash from the KMT and China’s pressure, Taiwan has every reason to foster ties with Japan, given that the two democracies share liberal democratic values and the importance of preventing any forces that seek to undermine regional security. Perhaps efforts to enhance economic and trade ties while forging supply chain integration are crucial to aligning the interests of the two like-minded partners.
Huynh Tam Sang is a doctoral student at the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science at National Tsing Hua University. Truong Tuan Kiet is a master’s student at the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science at National Tsing Hua University.
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