The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) challenges and ignores the international rules-based order by violating Taiwanese airspace using a high-flying drone: This incident is a multi-layered challenge, including a lawfare challenge against the First Island Chain, the US, and the world.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defines lawfare as “controlling the enemy through the law or using the law to constrain the enemy.” Chen Yu-cheng (陳育正), an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies, at Taiwan’s Fu Hsing Kang College (National Defense University), argues the PLA uses lawfare to create a precedent and a new de facto legal framework ripe for exploitation by the PLA.
On Jan. 17 of this year, a high-flying PLA Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) flew for four minutes through Taiwan’s national territorial airspace over the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands, 東沙群島). Taiwan’s MND identified the aircraft as a Guizhou WZ-7 Soaring Dragon (無偵-7 翔龍) — a high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) turbojet-powered UAV with the ability to conduct reconnaissance and carry cruise missiles. The WZ-7’s cruise speed is 750km/h, with a range of 7,000km, endurance of 10 hours (at maximum turbojet speed), and a service ceiling of 18,000m. Taiwan’s MND acknowledged that this was the first instance of a PLA aircraft overflight of Pratas Island.
Numerous previous drone incidents have occurred over the Kinmen Islands: On May 25, 2024, a Chinese influencer used a drone to drop anti-independence political leaflets over Kinmen County’s Erdan Island (二膽島), according to media reports on May 27; on June 8, 2024, another civilian drone dropped leaflets at the Mashan Broadcasting and Observation Station (馬山觀測站) in Kinmen County; on Sept. 1, 2022, a civilian drone entered civilian water and was destroyed by Taiwanese forces; on Aug. 30, 2022 Taiwanese troops fired warning shots at unidentified civilian drones from Xiamen (廈門); on Aug. 16, 2022 an unidentified civilian low-flying drone captured close-up footage of Taiwanese soldiers throwing rocks to drive it away; on Aug. 4, 2022, PLA drones penetrated Kinmen’s airspace for the first time and the ROC military fired flares in response. On July 28, 2022, a PLA reconnaissance drone appeared twice over Taiwan’s Dongyin Island, Matsu. (東引, 馬祖).
As early as 2022, the ROC military was challenged by drone overflights of Taiwan’s islands close to China. The MND’s non-response to the PLA drone overflight of Pratas indicated to the PLA that the MND also would not — or could not — respond to PLA high-altitude drones over islands farther away from China. MND and the political leadership decided to announce the overflight, which showed vulnerabilities, albeit with better transparency.
Taiwan should assume that a PLA operation could occur against any of its islands, including the main island. Taiwan’s lack of preparation and lack of response only encourages the CCP to continue testing Taiwan’s defenses. Recall that China is ruled by a Leninist Communist Party and Lenin’s dictum applies: “You probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw.”
Similarly, when the PLA Rocket Forces launched four missiles over Taiwan on Aug. 6, 2022, after then US house speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit, Taiwan had no missile defense system (Patriot PAC-3, maximum altitude about 20km, or Tien Kung III (天弓, Sky Bow III), maximum altitude 45-70km) that could intercept the missiles due to altitude limitations; the PLA missiles were about 100km above Taiwan at their apogee and landed in Japanese exclusive economic zone sea. The new Tien Kung IV which is scheduled to enter service this year is designed to intercept high-altitude targets at up to 70-100km. The new PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) can only reach 60km. Taiwan missed an opportunity to assess its missile defense system against a real, inexpensive target.
These events create legal precedents and motivate the CCP to continue to overfly Taiwan and its islands. The PLA could exploit these cases in different ways: fly over additional islands, fly higher over Taiwan’s main island out of range of Taiwan’s air and missile defense systems, increase the numbers of drones in each overflight (such as a swarm of drones), fly an armed drone or a fighter jet over the island and strike the launcher or jet fighter if fired upon, change the domain to surface vessels violating the territorial waters, or any combination thereof. In other words, the PLA will continue to probe with a bayonet until deterred.
Pratas is the ideal island for the PLA to forcibly annex. Pratas is 440km away from the southern tip of Taiwan, 315km southeast of Hong Kong, 450km northeast of PLA-occupied Woody Island (Yongxing Island, 永興島), and 490km north of the Philippines, placing it in the middle of the major shipping lane controlling the southern entrance of the Taiwan Strait. Although Taiwan promised to not militarize the island and made it into a nature preserve, Pratas would be an ideal location for the PLA to control access into the Taiwan Strait from the South China Sea, especially if it is fortified with anti-ship, anti-air, anti-missile, and anti-submarine weapon systems, long-range radars, fighters and bombers.
Taiwan can respond symmetrically and/or asymmetrically to these overflights. Symmetric responses could be to shoot down the drone by Taiwanese F-16 and Mirage 2000-5 fighters forward deployed to Pratas. Both aircraft can shoot down a UAV flying up to 60,000 feet using air-to-air missiles. One challenge for fighter aircraft is being at the right place at the right time to shoot it down — when it flies over Pratas or any other island. The ROC military would also have to assess whether the PLA might place defensive fighter patrols nearby. Another symmetric capability would be to deploy air and missile defense assets on the island or on nearby naval ships, such as the Sea Oryx (海劍羚) (max intercept altitude of 10,000 feet), Tien-Kung II (TK-天弓, Sky Bow) (100,000 feet), TK III (150,000 feet), TK IV (230,000 feet). The US can also deploy sea-based and ground-based air and missile defense systems near or on Taiwan and its islands, such as AEGIS-capable ships and ground-based Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD systems. Perhaps Taiwan’s leaders should seek to purchase Israel’s war-proven air and missile defense systems.
Asymmetric responses to PLA overflights could include reciprocal intrusion (mirroring) by flying a reconnaissance drone over one of China’s islands, or employ electronic warfare, directed energy, or jamming against the PLA violator or its satellite link so that it loses its command-and-control (C2) channel and crashes into the ocean, or taking control of the drone and forcing it to land in Taiwan. Taiwan can use non-military capabilities against China such as economic warfare, including reducing sales of semiconductors.
Taiwan’s MND have reported on PLA balloons overflying Taiwan. However, these “innocent” PLA balloons could carry intelligence collection systems to investigate vulnerabilities and assist in war planning. The balloons also could carry precision guided munitions or cheap quadcopters to conduct a swarm attack. Taiwan should consider using a laser-based weapon (ground, sea, or air based) against balloons. Similarly, since Taiwan has not shot down any of the more than two hundred balloons detected flying near Taiwan since late 2023, the CCP has created another legal precedent — lawfare. In 2023, the US shot down at least two PLA reconnaissance balloons and three other unidentified objects, and, in 2024, India shot down a PLA reconnaissance balloon.
Whether the PLA launches drones, balloons, missiles, ships, submarines or aircraft over or near Taiwan’s territory, Taiwan’s leaders should understand that inaction tells the CCP that Taiwan is weak. Inaction emboldens the CCP to bully Taiwan and creates a legal precedent which the CCP will exploit via lawfare against Taiwan, and other countries. Taiwan has symmetrical and asymmetrical options to respond to these acts of aggression. The US and its allies can also help by providing air and missile defense assets near or on Taiwan, just as was done for Israel when Iran launched several massive ballistic missile barrage and drone attacks.
Although the above discussion has been in the military dimension, the CCP’s violation of Taiwanese territory can be used to influence electoral campaigns. The Democratic Progressive Party could be criticized as a warmonger if it reacts to the CCP aggression, and weak and unfit to govern if it does not react. Before the last Taiwanese presidential election, China tried to manipulate voting behavior by launching more than 100 balloons during and soon after the election campaign.
Taiwan could prepare for such acts and convert them into counterpropaganda against the CCP. The Philippines have used “assertive transparency” to counter the CCP’s aggression against Filipino fishermen and the Philippine Coast Guard. Their broadcasting of the CCP’s illegal behavior mobilizes national solidarity against the CCP as well as rallies international support for the Philippines. The CCP has struggled to counter the Philippine narrative. At a minimum Taiwan should act accordingly.
Until Taiwan and the US do more to counter the CCP’s hegemonic behavior against Taiwan, the CCP will continue practicing unrestricted warfare through multi-dimensional aggression.
Guermantes Lailari is a retired US Air Force Foreign Area Officer specializing in counterterrorism, irregular warfare, missile defense, and strategy. He holds advanced degrees in international relations and strategic intelligence. He was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellow in 2022, a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University and National Defense University in 2023, and a visiting researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in 2024 and 2025. He is currently researching in Taiwan as a senior non-resident fellow from the Jewish Policy Center in Washington, DC.
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