Chile has elected a new government that has the opportunity to take a fresh look at some key aspects of foreign economic policy, mainly a greater focus on Asia, including Taiwan.
Still, in the great scheme of things, Chile is a small nation in Latin America, compared with giants such as Brazil and Mexico, or other major markets such as Colombia and Argentina. So why should Taiwan pay much attention to the new administration?
Because the victory of Chilean president-elect Jose Antonio Kast, a right-of-center politician, can be seen as confirming that the continent is undergoing one of its periodic political shifts, this time to the right, traditionally more inclined to see free trade as an engine of growth — not dependency — and more willing to establish closer relations with liberal democracies with whom it shares common values.
This century started with what was called a “pink wave” of far-left Latin American governments in the wake of the rise to power of Hugo Chavez as Venezuela’s president, who was emboldened by record (and ultimately wasted) profits generated by the commodities boom in the first decade of the century.
The early 2000s “pink wave” included Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, then-Argentine president Nestor Kirchner, then-Bolivian president Evo Morales, then-Ecuadoran president Rafael Correa and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, among others. It marked a significant turn away from economic liberalization and, in some cases, democratic politics, but it largely failed. The next election cycle brought successors from the opposition in most of the region (including Chile), though not in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua or Cuba.
However, this “conservative” counterwave did not last long and it was followed by a “second pink wave” in many of the same nations — until now.
Along with Kast in Chile, a new “conservative counterwave” is taking shape in the region with Argentine President Javier Milei, Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz, Honduran President Nasry Asfura and Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, but mostly with the quite probable election this year of right-leaning governments in Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Costa Rica.
What all this means for Latin America we will only know in a few years. What it means for Taiwan is a window of opportunity, because it should be easier to strengthen ties with a new crop of nonsocialist governments. They have every reason to welcome investment with one of Asia’s most developed nations and one of the world’s most powerful innovation hubs, with a crucial role in the strategic global supply chain of semiconductors.
All of Latin America’s nations are developing economies that need the kinds of products and know-how that Taiwan can provide in areas such as green energy, biotechnology, smart cities, electric vehicles and cybersecurity. The region represents a continental market of more than 660 million people, and its most relevant actors are democracies that can relate to Taiwan’s past struggle with authoritarian rule and present geopolitical challenges.
Does this mean these nations would be willing to strain relations with China, the No. 1 trade partner for most of them, for the sake of doing more business with Taiwan?
Certainly not. Political overtures to Taiwanese autonomy or questioning the “one China” policy would help neither Taiwan nor its partners in Latin America. Doing more business with Taiwan does not have to mean — and should not mean — antagonizing Beijing. It only means trading more and exchanging knowledge. It is not an either/or proposition, but rather a chance for a win-win scenario.
For this to happen, Taiwan needs to take the initiative. This new crop of Latin American governments less bound by ideology and more moved by pragmatism can hopefully open a window for Taiwanese companies and research institutions to tap into a potentially rich field of opportunities.
Marcel Oppliger is a Chilean journalist based in Taiwan and host of the YouTube channel Taiwan Edge — Innovation Island.
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