If asked to name a place that is finding its way toward peace and growth after decades of political turmoil, few would think of the Fergana Valley, the fertile basin shared by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Yet this part of Central Asia now offers a lesson in how conflict can give way to stability, even in historically tense regions.
Such examples are increasingly valuable in today’s world. In 2024, there were 61 ongoing state-based conflicts, the most since records began in 1946. Battlefield deaths from the fighting in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Myanmar and other theaters totaled about 129,000.
While the lowering of tensions in Central Asia brings new opportunities for economic development and stable politics, it also invites increased pressure from major powers that are competing for influence. There is a risk that competition between the US, China, Russia, Europe, India and others would reignite old frictions. However, the improved climate reflects deliberate political and social choices, demonstrating that cooperation can be strengthened from the ground up.
Home to about 15 million people, the Fergana Valley is one of the most densely populated parts of Central Asia. Owing to overlapping ethnic ties, contested frontiers, and pressures on land and water, it was long seen as a potential flash point. It was the site of the 1990 Osh riots in Kyrgyzstan, among the bloodiest ethnic clashes of the late-Soviet era, and then of incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000. Then came recurring border skirmishes and localized violence. Hundreds were killed in the ethnic clashes in Osh and Jalal-Abad (another Kyrgyz city) in 2010, as were dozens in 2021 and more than a hundred in 2022.
However, conditions have improved markedly since then. Borders have become points of connection rather than division. After being closed for seven years, the main crossing between Osh and Andijan (in Uzbekistan) reopened in 2017, reviving trade, reconnecting families and marking a turning point in cross-border relations. Natural resources, once a source of friction, are increasingly being managed cooperatively.
Central Asian governments’ management of water supplies and usage has been a major test. In 2023, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan signed a roadmap for a hydroelectric and water management project centered on a major new dam on the Naryn River, in southern Kyrgyzstan. The project was designed to expand renewable energy and regulate downstream water flow, politically sensitive issues that have sparked disputes in the past. At the same time, it showed how a joint initiative to realize shared infrastructure could turn a zero-sum conflict over water into a collective investment in stability.
The region’s leaders have also begun to formalize this strategic shift in other ways. Early last year, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a landmark border-demarcation agreement, soon followed by the presidents of all three Fergana Valley states meeting to sign a declaration of friendship and agree on a final tri-border point.
Of course, these developments do not erase past grievances or remove risks. Water scarcity, climate stress, local disputes and other challenges remain. The progress toward better relations has been uneven across the valley. Disparities in infrastructure, energy access and economic opportunity still generate tensions between communities, and some border districts remain heavily militarized. The durability of recent agreements would depend on whether local concerns can be addressed alongside regional diplomacy.
Diplomatic success so far has depended as much on daily interactions as on political agreements. Since the reopening of key crossings in 2017, cross-border trade between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has risen more than sevenfold, and more than 1 million people now cross the border each month for work, shopping or family visits. These flows of people and goods have created social and economic ties that make large-scale confrontation more distant and harder to imagine.
As Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov put it: “A close neighbor is better than a distant relative.”
Still, the same openness also creates vulnerabilities, from trafficking activities to migration shocks. Demographic pressure and unemployment among young people continue to test social stability, and climate-driven changes to the Syr Darya river system could sharpen competition over water in the coming decade. These factors make the Fergana Valley story a fragile achievement, not a settled one. Fortunately, the recognition of such pressures has itself been key to sustaining cooperation and avoiding complacency.
The Fergana experience offers lessons for other regions grappling with conflict. The stability has lasted because cooperation began at the level of markets, small businesses and individual travelers; it was not simply declared through high-level political agreements. Linking borders and resources has turned potential disputes over water and energy into shared interests. Clear, mutually recognized boundaries have helped keep borders open and reduce the risk of flare-ups.
In a fragmented international order, the ability to work across borders and manage shared resources is a strategic asset. The Fergana Valley suggests that peace and partnership can reinforce each other, but only if the effort is continuous.
As former US president John F. Kennedy once said, “peace is a daily, a weekly, a monthly process, gradually changing opinions, slowly eroding old barriers, quietly building new structures.” Through patience, cooperation and persistence, the Fergana Valley is showing how that process can take hold.
Dan Sleat is senior policy adviser on Russia and Ukraine at the Tony Blair Institute.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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