A familiar refrain is often heard whenever cross-strait tensions rise: The more tense things get, the more exchanges are needed. Some say that communication should always replace confrontation. On the surface, that sounds self-evident and reasonable. The real issue is not whether to engage or communicate at all. It is a far more fundamental question: Exchange what, and communicate about what?
Beijing’s position on Taiwan is no mystery. Its tactics are diverse and flexible, but its objective is singular and explicit. Every strand of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Taiwan policy serves one end: “one country, two systems” — the incorporation of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China, and with it, the erasure of the Republic of China (ROC).
Under that overarching goal, the CCP applies soft and hard measures. Those who help advance its objective are rewarded with access, exchanges and material benefits. Those who cannot — or who resist — are not merely excluded from dialogue, but punished.
Incentives, denial of communication and coercive pressure together form the three basic pillars of Beijing’s Taiwan strategy.
In plain terms, it is “united front” work.
Within Taiwan, three broad groups are evident: those driven by a “Greater China” nationalist sentiment, viewing unification as the ultimate value; the interest-oriented, lacking a firm national position and guided primarily by material considerations; and those who insist that the two sides of the Strait are not subordinate to each other, and that freedom and democracy are nonnegotiable.
Within the first group, some believe that unification matters more than the survival of the ROC itself. Others imagine that the ROC could somehow be used to “unify China.” The former need little discussion — the Taiwan Strait is not gated, and nothing prevents them from relocating to China and renouncing their ROC citizenship.
The latter might be idealistic, but also profoundly unrealistic.
From the CCP’s perspective, the first and second groups are prime targets for “united front” engagement — beneficiaries of exchange and inducement designed to cultivate and consolidate a Chinese national identity.
The third group, by contrast, is not to be engaged, but suppressed and might even be targeted for attack.
The logic defines CCP’s current Taiwan policy: Use the first group, co-opt the second and strike the third. That, in essence, is “united front” work.
Given how clear the objectives and methods are, Taiwanese must approach calls for exchanges and communication with caution. If engagement is meant to compel Beijing to acknowledge the existence of the ROC and insist on dialogue conducted with equality and dignity, then it aligns with mainstream public opinion. If not, such exchanges risk becoming little more than auxiliaries to Beijing’s “united front” strategy.
Engagement and communication, then, are not inherently synonymous with safeguarding sovereignty or defending democracy. At times of danger, dialogue might indeed be necessary.
However, there are also moments when more exchanges simply mean deeper entanglement within the “united front” framework — and greater risk as a result. When that is the case, meeting is worse than not meeting at all.
Lu Hai-tung is a university professor.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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