This is the season when columnists turn to prophecy, and then congratulate themselves a year later for getting some of it right. I am afraid I am about to join the club.
As I predicted at the end of 2024, Asia last year revolved around three main forces: the blossoming bromance between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), rising pressure on Taiwan, and a newly emboldened North Korean leader Kim Jong-un drawing closer to Moscow and Beijing.
These dynamics would only get more obvious this year. The region is heading into an increasingly precarious year, with deepening tensions that would have a cascading effect on all of us.
Illustration: Mountain People
On the surface, Trump and Xi appear to have found a new warmth — but it is fragile. Xi was the winner of the trade war last year, which means Trump is going into this year on the back foot. That would not be lost in Washington, no matter how loud the bluster. While the rapprochement has been welcomed by markets, a lot could go wrong. They would have the opportunity to meet as many as four times, providing multiple occasions for relations to head south.
And even if they do not, they would likely remain tense, a Mercator Institute for China Studies forecast for US-China relations said. Almost three-quarters of respondents, comprising China experts and observers, see relations deteriorating across the board, from military and trade ties to technology. That is despite Trump’s decision to allow Nvidia Corp to sell advanced chips to China, watering down years of national security safeguards.
Nvidia’s top products would still be restricted, Washington said, but the move gives Beijing access to semiconductors at least a generation ahead of its best technology.
Tokyo has become more vocal about the link between its own security and stability in the Taiwan Strait, a position Beijing views as provocative. Xi would see how much he can push Trump on Taiwan, the self-governed democratic nation Beijing claims as its own. That would make Taipei more vulnerable.
President William Lai (賴清德) has his work cut out. He would need to navigate a politically gridlocked legislature while trying to pass a US$40 billion supplementary defense budget aimed at modernizing the military and bolstering deterrence to defend against the rising threat from China. Taiwan has already pledged to lift defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2030, up from more than 3 percent, but more money alone might not be enough.
US intelligence sources believe that Xi wants the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be capable of an invasion by next year. However, many military strategists suggested a full-scale invasion then is unlikely, as China’s economy grapples with a slowdown and the PLA reels from corruption probes and purges. They point to quarantine or blockade scenarios instead.
Beijing, which has vowed to take control of Taiwan through peaceful means, but has refused to rule out using force, has ramped up military and political pressure over the past few years to assert its claims. The PLA conducted a second day of live-fire military drills to Taiwan’s north on Tuesday, while China’s “gray zone” tactics — warplanes crossing the median line, naval patrols circling the nation, cyber and information warfare — are now near-daily events. These would almost certainly continue this year.
North Korea is among the most serious risks on Asia’s security landscape. A briefing last year from the US Defense Intelligence Agency said that Pyongyang has now developed an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental US.
Kim has repeatedly rejected denuclearization negotiations since the most recent talks in 2019 with Trump broke down. The North Korean leader views nuclear weapons as a guarantor of his security and has no intention of renouncing them. He is also being emboldened by his deepening ties with Russia and steady support from China, which is changing the calculus on the Korean Peninsula.
South Korean officials have hinted at the chance of a summit with the North this year, something unimaginable more than a year ago. This gives Kim leverage he has been looking for to potentially get sanctions relief, or extract tacit approval from the US that denuclearization has been a failure, and that he can go ahead and continue with his nuclear weapons program. Expect more missile launches, diplomatic theater and other attempts to hijack the geopolitical agenda.
Asia this year is not on the brink of war, but the region would be more volatile than it has been in recent memory. Buckle up.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter, and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
For Taiwan, the ongoing US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets are a warning signal: When a major power stretches the boundaries of self-defense, smaller states feel the tremors first. Taiwan’s security rests on two pillars: US deterrence and the credibility of international law. The first deters coercion from China. The second legitimizes Taiwan’s place in the international community. One is material. The other is moral. Both are indispensable. Under the UN Charter, force is lawful only in response to an armed attack or with UN Security Council authorization. Even pre-emptive self-defense — long debated — requires a demonstrably imminent
Since being re-elected, US President Donald Trump has consistently taken concrete action to counter China and to safeguard the interests of the US and other democratic nations. The attacks on Iran, the earlier capture of deposed of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and efforts to remove Chinese influence from the Panama Canal all demonstrate that, as tensions with Beijing intensify, Washington has adopted a hardline stance aimed at weakening its power. Iran and Venezuela are important allies and major oil suppliers of China, and the US has effectively decapitated both. The US has continuously strengthened its military presence in the Philippines. Japanese Prime
RSS