So much climate news comes out in any given week that it can be hard to keep up with it all. Much is gloomy, but there are positive developments all the time — so many, in fact, that it is easy to miss some of the things that have been happening.
For the past few years, I have been compiling year-end lists of the more neglected good and bad climate stories to give an idea of the immense amount of change as the world transitions to new sources of energy amid a gathering environmental crisis.
Here is my selection of major developments over the past 12 months.
DECARBONIZATION
You might not know it from the prevailing mood of defeatism, but in some parts of the world, decarbonizing electricity is approaching its endgame. Roughly three-quarters of power generation in the UK and Europe this year came from non-fossil sources, putting them in about the same place as Brazil and Canada, whose vast hydroelectric resources traditionally gave them some of the cleanest grids.
With more renewables added each year, projects under construction and in late-stage development should put Europe’s grid between 80 and 90 percent clean energy, the level at which further advances will start to get far more difficult without massive battery usage, new flexible technologies or both. That means a looming slowdown in renewable deployment, something that many will regard as some sort of failure. In fact, it is a testament to the monumental achievement so far and an example the rest of the world should now emulate.
PEAK CEMENT
As much as 8 percent of the world’s emissions come from the production of cement — but the collapse of China’s real-estate boom is turning that tide. The country’s output through October was the lowest since 2009, suggesting that the full-year total will be in the region of 1.7 billion tonnes. Combined with the sluggish 1 to 2 percent pace of growth forecast in the rest of the world, that suggests global consumption will be the lowest since 2012.
There might be further to fall. China still consumes 1.2 tonnes of cement per capita, about four times the rate of the rest of the world — but construction starts, a leading indicator for demand, are collapsing even faster, with commercial groundbreaking at its weakest since 2005.
Developed countries use only about 16 percent of global cement and China is now developed in all but name. A boom like the one we saw over the past decade will never return. Even India and sub-Saharan Africa would not be big enough to take its place.
GLOBAL EVS
If you were looking only at the parlous state of electric vehicle (EV) sales in some developed markets — the US, say, or Japan or Italy — you might think the entire technology is faltering. Far from it. Plug-in cars have been comprising more than half of all sales in China and just under one-third in Europe in recent months. More dramatic, though, is what has been happening in less-noticed developing countries.
EVs have had a sales share of more than 20 percent in recent months in Turkey, Thailand and Vietnam, while Indonesia is not far behind. Markets as diverse as Nepal, Ethiopia, Laos, Armenia and the United Arab Emirates are adopting EVs far faster than many developed countries. Among sales of passenger vehicles worldwide in the September quarter, 27.3 percent came with a plug, according to BloombergNEF.
If you think the EV revolution is losing speed, it is probably just a sign that your own domestic market is getting left behind.
I did a similar what-you-missed exercise last year. You can read the piece to decide whether my predictions came to pass or not, but here is my attempt at an unbiased assessment:
‧ A New Dawn for Solar: China’s solar industry has endured a season in hell. We argued that rising sales and thinner spending would restore profitability. China’s six large solar players have indeed cut capital expenditures to about half of last year’s level, but new rules at home and ongoing trade protectionism elsewhere mean BloombergNEF expects installations this year to rise only about 16 percent — a pedestrian pace for the sector.
Far from returning to the black, losses are deepening, with little sign of relief in sight.
‧ Europe Goes Electric: Sales of plug-in cars in Europe hit a speed bump late last year, leading many to predict that the region’s shift to EVs was stalling. We argued that the slowdown was temporary, with performance this year likely to far outstrip predictions of 3.2 million sales. That looks to be on the money. By the end of September, the year-to-date growth rate was 28 percent, which should translate into nearly 3.9 million sales across the full year, just a pip short of the 4 million number we pegged.
‧ Charging Up the Grid: A key element of electricity bill increases after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was the pivotal role played by surging gas in setting the cost of power across the entire market. We argued that the rise of lithium-ion was likely to shave these peaks by giving batteries a bigger role and flattening the extreme spikes seen in previous years.
That seems to be playing out in some places: Wholesale prices in Australia’s main grid fell about 8 percent from a year earlier in the September quarter, thanks in part to reduced volatility and batteries undercutting gas.
The course of the energy transition never did run smooth — but I have noticed over the past few years of writing these lists that events in retrospect look much better than the depressing prospect you get from a cursory look at the news. Let us hope that pattern plays out next year, too.
David Fickling is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering climate change and energy. Previously, he worked for Bloomberg News, the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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