In deterrence theory, success is not determined by military force alone, but is underpinned by three pillars: capability, credibility and message control.
Message control converts raw military power into psychological and political restraint. Without it, even an overwhelming force can fail to deter.
The US’ latest National Security Strategy (NSS) marked a clear shift in its messaging toward China — and it is precisely that shift that should concern Taiwan most.
Unlike the report under former US president Joe Biden, which designated China as the US’ primary strategic competitor, the new report toned down its language regarding systemic rivalry, ideological confrontation and revisionism. Instead, it focused on trade imbalances, negotiations and transactional bargaining.
To some in Washington, it might look like a step back. To Beijing, it is a highly legible political signal: The relationship is moving away from structural confrontation and toward a space that is negotiable, testable and adjustable. In deterrence terms, it is a rhetorical downgrade that weakens political clarity and erodes perceived resolve.
Even more troubling for Taiwan is how the new strategy treats the Taiwan Strait. While the report still emphasizes maintaining military deterrence, its political commitment to the nation is noticeably diluted. Language about deterring unilateral changes to the “status quo” is more indirect, and Taiwan’s political status is left more ambiguous.
That is consistent with US President Donald Trump’s preference for strategic ambiguity and transactional diplomacy.
The US is preserving military capability while maintaining political flexibility for bargaining. It is a dangerous combination for deterrence stability: Force exists, but the will to use it is kept deliberately opaque.
The new security report has effectively discredited the long-standing claim by some Taiwanese commentators that Trump has a clear and institutionalized “decoupling-from-Europe, protecting-Taiwan” grand strategy. If such a strategy truly existed in a stable and predictable form, it would be codified in the US’ highest-level national security document.
Instead, what appeared is a softer China framework, elastic language on Taiwan and a broad transactional orientation. That leaves optimistic assumptions about Trump’s automatic protection of Taiwan with little institutional foundation.
From a deterrence perspective, ambiguity from the defender benefits the challenger. When message control deteriorates, red lines blur. When red lines blur, the incentive to test boundaries increases. It does not reduce the risk of war, it creates strategic uncertainty. “Gray zone” coercion, political warfare, economic pressure and quasi-blockade tactics thrive in such ambiguous environments.
China places immense weight on political signaling. Beijing does not judge US resolve by weapons alone, but by the consistency and discipline of Washington’s official language. When confrontation is rhetorically softened and commitments are blurred, Chinese leaders infer a preference for risk management over risk absorption and calibrate their pressure accordingly.
For Taiwan, the most dangerous misreading would be to interpret the signals as reassurance. That would reflect a form of “ostrich mentality,” or comfort built on selective perception rather than institutional evidence.
Ultimately, Taiwan’s security does not rest on a US president’s “secret option.” It is based on Taiwan’s defense posture, sustained military investment, social resilience and political preparedness. When great powers deliberately blur their messages and preserve a room for deals, small states must treat the risk as rising, not falling.
Simon Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton, who lectures on international relations.
The cancelation this week of President William Lai’s (賴清德) state visit to Eswatini, after the Seychelles, Madagascar and Mauritius revoked overflight permits under Chinese pressure, is one more measure of Taiwan’s shrinking executive diplomatic space. Another channel that deserves attention keeps growing while the first contracts. For several years now, Taipei has been one of Europe’s busiest legislative destinations. Where presidents and foreign ministers cannot land, parliamentarians do — and they do it in rising numbers. The Italian parliament opened the year with its largest bipartisan delegation to Taiwan to date: six Italian deputies and one senator, drawn from six
Recently, Taipei’s streets have been plagued by the bizarre sight of rats running rampant and the city government’s countermeasures have devolved into an anti-intellectual farce. The Taipei Parks and Street Lights Office has attempted to eradicate rats by filling their burrows with polyurethane foam, seeming to believe that rats could not simply dig another path out. Meanwhile, as the nation’s capital slowly deteriorates into a rat hive, the Taipei Department of Environmental Protection has proudly pointed to the increase in the number of poisoned rats reported in February and March as a sign of success. When confronted with public concerns over young
Taiwan and India are important partners, yet this reality is increasingly being overshadowed in current debates. At a time when Taiwan-India relations are at a crossroads, with clear potential for deeper engagement and cooperation, the labor agreement signed in February 2024 has become a source of friction. The proposal to bring in 1,000 migrant workers from India is already facing significant resistance, with a petition calling for its “indefinite suspension” garnering more than 40,000 signatures. What should have been a straightforward and practical step forward has instead become controversial. The agreement had the potential to serve as a milestone in
China has long given assurances that it would not interfere in free access to the global commons. As one Ministry of Defense spokesperson put it in 2024, “the Chinese side always respects the freedom of navigation and overflight entitled to countries under international law.” Although these reassurances have always been disingenuous, China’s recent actions display a blatant disregard for these principles. Countries that care about civilian air safety should take note. In April, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) canceled a planned trip to Eswatini for the 40th anniversary of King Mswati III’s coronation and the 58th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic
RSS