In Taiwan, information security often only becomes a public issue after disaster strikes — everyone has some memory of someone in their life falling victim to a scam. The government on Thursday ordered Internet service providers to block access to the Chinese social media app Xiaohongshu (小紅書, also known as “RedNote” in English) under the Fraud Crime Hazard Prevention Act (詐欺犯罪危害防制條例), citing security risks and instances of fraud on the app. This move was not a sudden political gesture, but a reflection of the reality Taiwan has long grown accustomed to — when a platform refuses to engage with the nation’s legal system, user safety is put at risk.
The National Security Bureau’s cybersecurity review showed that Xiaohongshu is not just a social media platform with a few vulnerabilities — it is a data-harvesting engine. It collects all manner of users’ sensitive information — geolocation, contact lists, screenshots, connected devices, facial features and other biometric information — and even quietly sends that data when the app is not running. It failed to meet all 15 of the nation’s cybersecurity standards governing online platforms. This is not just one red light malfunctioning, but an entire stretch of traffic lights going out at once. The government has requested data security improvements, but the platform has yet to respond, signaling that it has already chosen to detach itself from Taiwan’s legal order.
In a short period, scams involving Xiaohongshu in Taiwan have expanded, from fake online shopping to fake investment schemes, from canceling installment payments to fraudulent online dating. In the past year alone, 1,706 cases of fraud have been identified through the app. Loose management and anonymous, untraceable cross-border accounts have turned Xiaohongshu into the preferred platform for scammer groups. The government is not punishing the app for being “too truthful,” but for leaving its moderation and oversight up to sheer luck.
Other major platforms such as Meta platforms, Google, Line and TikTok have legal representatives in Taiwan, and are willing to remove suspicious accounts or provide necessary information when requested. They are not perfect, but they try to comply with Taiwan’s laws.
This ban is not about some political confrontation or an expansion of digital oversight. It stems from a fundamental question — if you want to conduct business in Taiwan, can you choose to disregard its laws?
Critics are questioning why the government banned only Xiaohongshu instead of dealing with other China-based platforms that also pose cybersecurity risks. However, this overlooks the premise that the strength of law enforcement response is based on the degree and severity of harm. Xiaohongshu has seen the largest number of fraud cases in the past two years. The platform refuses to communicate, has no legal representation in Taiwan and has offered no data security improvement plan. Other platforms at least leave the door slightly open, while Xiaohongshu has shut it completely.
When a company treats Taiwan’s regulations as optional, the risks faced by the public become the government’s primary concern, and a ban becomes the government’s fast-acting preventative tool. The ban is not the end goal itself — it is a way to make the platform understand that Taiwan is not some open ground for harvesting personal data.
In a democratic society, freedom does not mean allowing platforms to treat users as resources to be mined at will. Whether a platform deserves trust is not determined by its style and design, but by whether it is willing to respond when regulators seek answers. Xiaohongshu chose silence, and the government was left with no choice but to say “no” on the public’s behalf.
Liu Che-ting is a writer.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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