The outcome of the presidential election in Honduras remains in the air. As of press time last night, it was a razor-thin tie between two right-wing candidates, Nasry Asfura of the National Party and his Liberal Party rival Salvador Nasralla. Honduran voters appear evenly divided on which candidate they want to lead their country. For Taiwan, both Asfura and Nasralla have said they could reverse Honduran President Xiomara Castro’s 2023 decision — which followed more than 80 years of diplomatic relations between Honduras and Taiwan — to cut diplomatic ties with Taipei and switch recognition to Beijing.
Such a reversal is a tantalizing prospect for Taiwan, not just because of the opportunity it presents for wresting a former diplomatic ally back from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but also for what it shows about the relative advantages of ties with Taipei over Beijing, despite China’s formidable economic clout. It could also open the door for further reversals from former allies, which were courted by China as part of punitive measures against Taiwan.
Castro was elected president in 2021 with a considerable mandate for change. Under her leadership, the country has seen moderate economic growth, and poverty and inequality have fallen, earning praise from the IMF for her administration’s prudent fiscal management. Practical considerations and promises of economic benefits would have informed her decision to switch diplomatic ties to China.
Taiwan had previously been the primary market for Honduran whiteleg shrimp, a major export for the Central American nation; in 2022, nearly 40 percent of its shrimp exports went to Taiwan. China had promised to purchase large amounts of the shrimp when the countries established diplomatic relations. Now, after losing the Taiwanese market and being let down by empty Chinese promises, whiteleg shrimp exports have plummeted 67 percent, 14,000 workers have lost their jobs and the Honduran whiteleg shrimp industry is on the verge of collapse.
The decision to switch ties has been a contentious election issue. Despite Castro’s initial popularity and improvements to the economy, China’s bounced checks have caused significant hardship and led to a reconsideration of the wisdom of rushing into Beijing’s arms.
Taiwan-based Honduran lawyer Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos (“Honduras reveals China’s cracks,” Nov. 6, page 8) wrote about how, in the months leading up to the election, with two candidates saying they would consider reversing ties back to Taiwan, Beijing authorities embarked on “a surge of activity that appears more like damage control than partnership building.” Ramos detailed a two-year deal signed in August for exporting 3,000 tonnes of shrimp, worth more than US$50 million, to China, “effectively binding their fulfillment to the ruling party’s continuation in power or to any incoming government’s willingness to keep ties with Beijing.” Combined with new scholarships and infrastructure deals, it all appeared to be a last-minute attempt to shore up goodwill toward China.
Honduras is not the only country to feel let down by China’s promises. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni pulled Italy out of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative because the promised economic benefits of joining it failed to materialize; the so-called 17+1 cooperation between China and central and eastern European countries (China-CEEC), as it was known in 2019, became the 14+1 China-CEEC by 2022, following the 2021 exit of Lithuania and the withdrawal of Estonia and Latvia a year later. Vilnius said that it had obtained almost no benefits from its membership.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Hsiao Kuang-wei (蕭光偉) yesterday said that the government was open to restoring diplomatic ties with Honduras should either Asfura or Nasralla win, as such a move could expand Taiwan’s international status and facilitate Taiwan’s contribution to the international community.
This is a necessarily cautious approach by the ministry; hopefully behind it is the realization of what an opportunity this presents to Taiwan. The reversal of diplomatic recognition would be a significant coup, not just because of the immediate benefits of gaining a prodigal ally, one with which Taiwan has historical relations and would think thrice before switching back to Beijing: It also sends the message that such a move is viable, should other governments decide to emulate Honduras. It also sets Taiwan apart from the PRC as a distinct entity, not just for potential allies, but for the international community as a whole.
If the offer to re-establish ties is made, the government should pursue it as a matter of urgency.
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when
US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (何立峰) are expected to meet this month in Paris to prepare for a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). According to media reports, the two sides would discuss issues such as the potential purchase of Boeing aircraft by China, increasing imports of US soybeans and the latest impacts of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs. However, recent US military action against Iran has added uncertainty to the Trump-Xi summit. Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) called the joint US-Israeli airstrikes and the
RSS