The Chinese government recently threatened to issue an Interpol arrest warrant for Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Puma Shen (沈伯洋) in a new wave of cognitive and psychological tactics to extend its transnational repression and in violation of international norms.
Along with a dozen Taiwanese officials, politicians and organizations, China last year named Shen a “die-hard Taiwanese independence separatist.” It also imposed sanctions barring Shen and his family from entering China, Macau and Hong Kong, and doing business in China or with Chinese firms.
The Chongqing security bureau last month launched a criminal probe into Shen on allegations of “secession-related” activities, such as his founding of the civil defense organization the Kuma Academy. The state-run Chinese Central Television last week aired a documentary threatening to issue a “global arrest” through Interpol’s cross-border judicial cooperation.
Compared with some renowned advocates dedicated to Taiwanese independence, Shen is not a major activist. It could be reasonably inferred that China is targeting Shen because his efforts to promote Taiwan’s defense capabilities and social mobilization have critically struck a nerve on China’s ambition to invade Taiwan. Shen’s legislative proposals to bolster Taiwan’s national security against China’s infiltration could also have irritated Beijing.
As China has no jurisdiction over Taiwan, all of its high-profile aggressive actions are meant to create a false illusion of its long-arm jurisdiction over Taiwan, aiming to sow division and instill fear among Taiwanese.
This transnational repression is not just about Shen personally, but an act of collective coercion against all Taiwanese. China’s moves also demonstrate its violation of democratic freedom and human rights, as well as its distortion and contempt for international norms.
Interpol’s core mission is to combat international criminal offenses such as terrorism, drug trafficking and money laundering, and its operations are strictly bound by the principle of political neutrality. Article 3 of its charter explicitly prohibits the organization from engaging in activities of a political, military, religious or racial nature. This clause is the cornerstone of Interpol’s professionalism and credibility.
Although China has extradition treaties with more than 60 countries, most of them — especially democratic countries — would not extradite political prisoners or prisoners of conscience based on Beijing’s unilateral accusations.
On the other hand, China’s global targeting of people and groups perceived as threats to Beijing has already drawn international condemnation, and led to a number of anti-China countermeasures.
According to Freedom House, 1,219 incidents of transnational repression were reported from 2014 to last year, with China ranking as the top perpetrator.
G7 leaders in June issued a joint statement strongly condemning transnational repression, and called for cooperation to curb intimidation by authoritarian regimes worldwide.
The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, which brings together parliamentary members of 43 countries, recently issued the Brussels Declaration condemning China’s transnational repression, and pledged to take concrete action to stop cross-border repression, such as urging all members’ respective governments to reaffirm their commitment to human rights.
All Taiwanese should unite to resist Chinese coercion and be alert to cross-strait interactions. Any appeasement and concessions, such as the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) reluctance to condemn Beijing, only embolden the aggressor.
Shen’s case should be a lesson and an opportunity to augment Taiwan’s alliance with like-minded countries to collectively confront cross-border intimidation.
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