On Oct. 31, the Chinese embassy in the US posted several images on social media of Taiwan taken by China’s Jilin-1 remote sensing satellite, including shots of Taipei and the Hsinchu Science Park. It wrote: “Every inch of Taiwan Province, China, is vibrant under the Jilin-1 space satellite’s perspective.”
Taiwan is a democratic country, where people enjoy all kinds of freedom. Naturally, every inch of it is vibrant.
As for China, faced with young Chinese “lying flat” (躺平) — a Chinese-language slang term that describes rejection of societal pressure to over-achieve at work or school — and business involution, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is at his wits’ end. Clearly, vibrant Taiwan is not a province of a stagnant China.
Take out a map, point to it and claim that “all of this belongs to China.” This is a reminder of the saying from the Book of Songs (詩經), which states that for the emperors of the Zhou Dynasty, “all land under heaven belongs to the emperor and all people are his subjects.”
Such cultural traditions have been passed on and inherited by “emperor” Xi, successor to the Zhou Dynasty emperors. No wonder all Chinese rulers are more like emperors of a “Chinese empire.” Could other countries accept Xi as their emperor too?
By posting the satellite images the day after a meeting between Xi and US President Donald Trump, Beijing was clearly targeting Washington. Before the meeting, Trump had said that “Taiwan is Taiwan.” Xi did not bring up the Taiwan issue during the talk so as not to court a rebuff.
However, a picture is worth a thousand words.
Why did Xi actually need the summit more than Trump did? Because he needed to show himself off to Chinese through it. The Chinese economy was rising when China-US relations were good and is falling now that ties have frayed. Anti-Xi forces accuse him of being incompetent, blaming him for damaging China’s relationship with the US, so he needed the meeting to prove that he is capable of working with the US.
To this end, he even removed Li Chenggan (李成鋼), who met with disfavor from Washington, from his post as China’s permanent representative to the WTO right before meeting.
As for rare earths, soy beans, fentanyl and other policy items, they are insignificant to Xi and can be altered at any time. With the meeting, he could not only silence his political rivals, but also continue his anti-US stance.
The Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Central Committee recently convened its fourth plenary session, which passed the 15th Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development, covering from next year to 2030. Essentially, it is a plan designed to catch up and then surpass the US in almost every aspect. By 2035, Beijing plans to achieve “basic socialist modernization,” which means reaching the GDP per capita level of moderately developed countries.
However, Xi was unable to specify an annual growth rate, and merely said that he sought a “reasonable” level, which can be interpreted arbitrarily.
Xi is mirroring Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) grand ambition of “surpassing the UK and catching up with the US,” but if he cannot solve the problems of deflation, involution and diplomatic isolation, would his efforts not be in vain?
As the US stays alert to China, its biggest security threat, there would be no return to the era of China’s “panda diplomacy.”
Paul Lin is a political commentator.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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