In the Dutch parliamentary elections late last month, the liberal-progressive Democrats 66 (D66) secured a slim lead, finishing just ahead of the nationalist Party for Freedom (PVV).
Rob Jetten, a modernist at the helm of D66, has tasked Wouter Koolmees with scouting potential allies for a new government. In his speech celebrating the party’s most historic electoral success, Jetten expressed his intention to build a coalition with the pro-European forces that followed the PVV: the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, 22 seats), the GreenLeft-Labour (GL-PvdA, 20) and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA, 18).
Reaching a workable compromise between the VVD and the GL-PvdA will be the toughest challenge, given their stark differences on environmental and immigration policy.
The GL-PvdA supports bold climate initiatives, such as phasing out gasoline-powered vehicles and accelerating the shift to renewable energy. The VVD is reluctant to move too quickly on the electric vehicle transition, citing concerns over economic disruption at the national and EU levels.
Immigration is the issue that most clearly divides the potential coalition, with the CDA leaning toward the more inclusive stance of the Greens and the Social Democrats rather than the restrictive line of the VVD.
It was this very disagreement — sparked by then-Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte’s push to tighten family reunification rules for asylum seekers — that brought down his final government, just months before he assumed the role of NATO secretary-general.
The CDA and the D66 stood firm, rejecting what they saw as unjustified severity. Their position mirrored that of the Labour Party, whose former leader Frans Timmermans insisted on a more humane and responsible approach in which asylum and integration policies were to reflect European values of solidarity and inclusion.
Unlike the deep divisions exposed by the migration dossier, all parties potentially involved in forming the next Dutch government share a common stance on foreign policy — including in the Indo-Pacific region. They agree on the need to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, where no authoritarian actor is allowed to bend the rules, violate international norms or behave like an overbearing power indifferent to the sovereignty of other nations.
The alignment among the parties engaged in government formation talks is also evident in their approach to Taiwan. A parliamentary motion passed this year demonstrates a unified position on China’s conduct in the Taiwan Strait and Taipei’s role in global affairs.
The resolution, backed by all prospective coalition partners, calls for the condemnation of Chinese military drills in the Taiwan Strait, the promotion of official Dutch visits to Taipei and support for Taiwan’s inclusion in the WHO.
Few statements have captured the Dutch commitment to Taiwan as vividly as those of Jan Paternotte, former parliamentary leader of the D66, who stressed the deep connection between the two nations and the urgency for the Netherlands to act decisively in support.
Paternotte stressed the importance of correctly interpreting UN Resolution 2758, through which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) obtained its permanent seat on the UN Security Council at the expense of the Republic of China on Taiwan. He emphasized that the PRC’s attempt to isolate 24 million Taiwanese by distorting UN Resolution 2758 must be stopped.
The adoption of the resolution by parties across the Dutch political spectrum reflects a shared understanding of the need to separate the EU’s “one China policy” from the “one China principle,” which Beijing uses to frame its claims over Taiwan’s sovereignty.
A future Dutch government under Jetten — contingent on bridging the gap between the VVD and the GL-PvdA or involving the JA21 Conservative Liberals, a national-conservative party with a focus on sovereignty and security — is expected to pursue a strategy aimed at safeguarding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait without allowing economic or trade interests to dilute its adherence to principled values.
Although likely to avoid explicit statements on Taiwan’s statehood, the incoming administration seems prepared to take a clear stand, recognizing the critical nature of this geopolitical juncture in the broader struggle between democratic and authoritarian systems.
This approach stands in marked contrast to what might unfold in the Czech Republic, and to what is already occurring in Hungary and Slovakia, where misalignment with the EU’s dominant position reflects internal dynamics that weaken the bloc’s shared commitment to defending democracy and liberty on the global stage.
Michele Maresca is an analyst at Il Caffe Geopolitico, an online international law journal, and the Geopol21 think tank.
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