In his op-ed published in the Taipei Times on Thursday last week (“Koo must take a stand on defense,” Oct. 30, page 8), Formosa Republican Association chairman and Taiwan United Nations Alliance director Tommy Lin (林逸民) highlighted the crisis of silence within the Ministry of National Defense.
When a politician says that Chinese military aircraft are “defending” Taiwan, such remarks transcend the bounds of free speech — they constitute a direct threat to national security and stain the honor of our military.
Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄) remaining silent under the pretext of “administrative neutrality” only further blurs the line between friend and foe, and the ministry’s silence would inevitably be viewed as tacit approval.
So-called “administrative neutrality” is meant to prevent government officials from engaging in partisan disputes. However, when Chinese military aircraft surround Taiwan and threaten national security, any rhetoric that supports or excuses China’s military actions is a blow to the morale of our armed forces.
If Koo continues to employ a cautious approach, he could struggle to meet the challenges of the era of information warfare. To be silent at this critical moment is tantamount to a retreat.
As Lin pointed out, a contrast existed during former president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration — a firm Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a timid Ministry of National Defense. While diplomacy could be used to seek peace, a nation’s defense posture must be one of readiness — able to fight, willing to fight and unafraid of war.
President William Lai (賴清德) said that “peace must rely on strength.” Koo should act on this principle by safeguarding morale within the military and demonstrating determination abroad.
Administrative neutrality is not a moral vacuum, nor can it serve as a shield to avoid taking a clear stance.
Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) should remain vigilant. The NT$10,000 cash handouts pushed by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) represent a surrender of fiscal discipline and to populist pressure.
As the legislative alliance between the KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) moves toward promoting a bill recognizing the so-called “1992 consensus,” this is no longer merely an economic issue, but a sign that Taiwan’s sovereign defenses are collapsing. If the executive branch maintains its hypocritical stance, it would face political and sovereign attacks.
The “1992 consensus” is a term former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) in 2006 admitted making up in 2000. It refers to a tacit understanding between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge that there is “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means.
The Ministry of National Defense should establish clear guidelines on the boundary between friendly and enemy-aligned speech, treating any rhetoric that echoes or justifies China’s military actions as a national security issue.
Politicians or figures who blur the line between friend and foe must be strongly rebuked to safeguard the morale of Taiwan’s military and preserve public trust.
Koo must have the courage to name the enemy, and Cho must have the resolve to reject populist blackmail. Only when the defense and administrative branches harden their stance could Taiwan gain a firm footing amid the turbulence of US President Donald Trump’s second term and internal unrest within China.
Hsiao Hsi-huei is a freelance writer.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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