After Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairwoman-elect Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) victory in the party’s leadership race, the KMT’s intent to bring in external forces to counter its domestic political rivals became all the more apparent.
There is no shortage of such stories in history. At the end of the Ming Dynasty, militant Wu Sangui (吳三桂) — in seeking revenge for the loss of his concubine after rebels captured Beijing — opened the Shanghai Pass to allow the Qing army to enter. While the Qing forces indeed defeated peasant rebel leader Li Zicheng (李自成), they ultimately destroyed the Ming Dynasty. Wu later rebelled himself, only to be crushed by the Qing army.
At the end of the Tang Dynasty, warlord Zhu Quanzhong (朱全忠) relied on the Shatuo Turks (沙陀突厥) to suppress the remnants of the peasant rebellion led by black-market salt dealer Huang Chao (黃巢), but the two later turned against one another, plunging the realm into chaos.
Every historical instance of borrowing power has resulted in a century of humiliation. Those who seek to kill with a borrowed knife inevitably suffer the backlash. History has demonstrated countless times that external forces never offer help for free. Rather, they provide a fleeting reward before seizing the entire country.
Taiwan’s pro-China faction has forgotten history and discarded its lessons, driven by its own illusions. What is referred to as the “pro-China camp” has shifted from a political stance to a weak sense of sovereignty. When a political party relies on a foreign hostile power, it no longer represents voters — it is merely an agent of the enemy.
What was once a self-run business has become a franchise, degenerating into a branch directly managed by the other side of the Taiwan Strait. In politics, this is a betrayal of loyalty.
From Wu to Cheng, the problem has never been in China’s strength, but instead in that some in Taiwan seek to invite foreign powers to destroy their domestic political rivals.
Yet history has already written the ending — those who rely on external forces would eventually be devoured by them.
Chang Shang-yang is a farmer.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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