On Oct. 4, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected former minister of economic security Sanae Takaichi as its new leader, putting her on course to become Japan’s first female prime minister.
To Taiwan, Takaichi is not a stranger. She met with President William Lai (賴清德) during a visit to Taipei in April, and in July, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) met her in Osaka during his trip to Japan for the World Expo.
Just days before the LDP election, Takaichi described Taiwan as Japan’s “extremely important partner and a valued friend.”
Her endorsement of Taiwan and the long-standing cordial ties between Japan’s LDP and Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party have raised expectations of deeper collaboration.
Following her victory, Taiwan extended congratulations, with Lai describing Takaichi as “a staunch friend of Taiwan,” and expressing hope for stronger collaboration.
Meanwhile, Lin instructed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan, which serves as Taiwan’s de facto embassy in the absence of formal diplomatic ties, to convey Taiwan’s congratulations.
On Tuesday last week, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also requested that Japan support Taiwan’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) trade bloc.
There is basis for optimism about Taiwan-Japan relations under a new Japanese government. A protege of late Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and a proponent of “Abenomics,” Takaichi is expected to continue Abe’s policies of trade liberalization and international economic integration.
Abe’s legacy also includes bringing Japan into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which later evolved into the CPTPP. As Takaichi is the potential next Japanese prime minister, she is expected to continue promoting economic engagement abroad, a move that aligns with Taiwan’s hopes.
When Takaichi led a Japanese delegation to Taipei in April, Lai expressed his hope that Japan would sign an economic partnership agreement (EPA) with Taiwan, similar to the Taiwan-US Initiative on 21st Century Trade.
Taiwan has advantages in production and manufacturing, while Japan possesses materials, equipment and technology, making the two economies highly complementary. Takaichi voiced support for an EPA, saying she looked forward to further exchanges and negotiations.
Japan in 2015, under Abe, launched the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, an initiative encouraging Japanese businesses to invest in overseas infrastructure, viewed as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Meanwhile, Lai has urged partners to jointly build “non-red supply chains” to lessen dependence on China, saying that Beijing’s coercive expansion could “threaten the global free trade system and advanced technology markets.”
If Takaichi carries forward Abe’s infrastructure diplomacy, Taiwan and Japan could find common ground in deepening their partnership through the development of secure and resilient supply chains, bolstering both economies against Beijing’s economic coercion.
Security is another area where Taiwan-Japan collaboration could be elevated. During her April visit, Takaichi proposed that Japan, Taiwan, European countries, Australia and India form a “quasi-security alliance.” Such a security grouping can act like a “collective shield” against authoritarian aggression, she said.
In 2021, Takaichi also urged Washington and Tokyo to form a “joint operational plan” in case of possible conflicts in the Strait.
As a national security hawk and supporter of revising Article 9 of Japan’s post-World War II constitution — which renounces war and limits the country’s use of force to self-defense — Takaichi’s “quasi-security alliance” proposal should not be dismissed as a passing statement; rather, the idea could emerge as a serious security agenda if she consolidates power within the LDP.
Despite these promising aspects, it would be premature to assume Takaichi’s rise marks a turning point in the Taiwan-Japan relationship.
While praising Japan’s relationship with Taiwan, Takaichi has also expressed a desire to “engage in solid and candid dialogue with Chinese leaders” to ensure peace and stability across the Strait.
The choice of words reflects Takaichi’s cautious approach toward Beijing, Japan’s largest trading partner. She appears to intend to strike a balance between China and Taiwan, rather than tilting toward Taipei.
Considering her intention to calibrate assertiveness and restraint vis-a-vis Beijing, Lai’s “non-red supply chains” ambition might not be fully embraced by a new government in Japan.
Likewise, a quasi-security alliance is ambitious but uncertain, as none of the countries Takaichi mentioned have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. That makes defense cooperation challenging. It remains far from feasible to expect Australia, India, European countries or even Japan itself to risk Beijing’s ire by joining a security pact with Taiwan.
In this context, an EPA offers the most pragmatic path for Taiwan and Japan to deepen ties. Economic cooperation is feasible and can also serve as a psychological lever for both sides to move toward deeper collaboration.
If the National Diet elects Takaichi as prime minister, Taiwan-Japan relations would appear set to continue along the positive trajectory cultivated by former leaders on both sides.
However, given Takaichi’s placatory tone toward China and her need to navigate the LDP’s scandals and internal rifts, there are valid concerns that Taiwan-Japan ties might take time to fully flower.
Huynh Tam Sang is a Young Leaders Program member of the Pacific Forum, founder and editor-in-chief of the Vietnam Strategic Forum, and a PhD candidate at the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University. Truong Tuan Kiet is a master’s student at the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University, and a columnist at the Vietnam Strategic Forum.
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