The British navy frigate HMS Richmond on Friday last week transited the Taiwan Strait, prompting criticism from Chinese Senior Colonel Shi Yi (施毅) — a spokesman for the Chinese military’s Eastern Theater Command — who labeled the move as “disturbance and provocation.” In response, the British Ministry of Defence emphasized that the Richmond’s navigation was in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and constituted a routine passage in full compliance with international law and norms.
According to the UNCLOS, the breadth of a state’s territorial sea may not exceed 12 nautical miles (22.2km) from its baseline. As the narrowest part of the Taiwan Strait is approximately 130km wide, the territorial seas of China and Taiwan do not overlap — this leaves a substantial area of international waters around the median line of the strait.
Furthermore, articles 37 and 28 of the UNCLOS explicitly state that all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of unimpeded transit passage through “straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.” The Taiwan Strait connects the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and serves as a major global shipping route, thus meeting the requirements for freedom of navigation and overflight.
However, China has long asserted “sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over the Taiwan Strait, maintaining that foreign warships may only conduct “innocent” passage and must notify it beforehand. This stance effectively treats the Taiwan Strait as part of China’s internal waters. From Beijing’s perspective, any transit by foreign naval vessels is regarded as a challenge to its sovereignty — but for most other countries, such transits are necessary actions to uphold freedom of navigation and resist China’s excessive maritime claims.
The Richmond’s transit was not only lawful, but a strategic signal. It aligns with recent actions by allies such as the US, Canada and Australia, demonstrating Western countries’ determination to maintain a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region.
For Taiwan, the incident highlights that relying solely on the idea that international law is self-evident would be insufficient to secure the Taiwan Strait’s status. Taiwan should develop a strategy combining law and diplomacy.
First, it should continue to assert the Taiwan Strait’s status as international waters on the global stage and seek support from other like-minded nations. Second, it should employ think tanks and academic researchers to accumulate robust international legal discourse and form consistent state practice. Third, Taiwan should promote a freedom of navigation initiative that would allow coordinated transit through the Taiwan Strait by multiple countries, rather than by individual countries alone.
This approach would not only shift the international focus away from its narrow view of “Taiwan versus China,” but also highlight Taiwan’s position in cooperating with the international community.
The status of the Taiwan Strait is already clearly defined under international law. The issue lies not in the law, but in politics. Only by combining legal strategy with diplomatic action can Taiwan make the status of the Taiwan Strait as international waters a consensus among the international community. In doing so, Taiwan could play a more active role in maintaining regional security and a rules-based international order.
Jao Juei-cheng is a professor at National Taiwan Ocean University’s Institute of the Law of the Sea and is the Honorary Chairman of the Taiwan Maritime Law Association.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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