US President Donald Trump’s tirade against India over trade and Russian oil purchases threatens to undo two decades of diplomatic progress, analysts and officials say, and could derail other areas of cooperation as domestic political pressures drive both sides to harden their stances. India’s opposition parties and the general public have urged Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to stand up to what they call bullying by Trump, who on Wednesday signed an executive order subjecting Indian imports to an additional 25 percent in duties on top of an existing 25 percent tariff, due to its big purchases of Russian oil.
PARTNERS?
While India has emerged in recent years as a key partner for Washington in its strategic rivalry with China, its large US trade surplus and close relations with Russia — which Trump is seeking to pressure into agreeing to a peace agreement with Ukraine — have made it a prime target in the Republican president’s global tariff offensive. Trump’s taunt that India could buy oil from arch enemy Pakistan has also not gone down well in New Delhi, two Indian government sources said. India has also rejected repeated claims by Trump that he used trade as a lever to end a recent military conflict between India and Pakistan.
In an unusually sharp statement this week, India accused the US of double standards in singling it out for Russian oil imports, while continuing to buy Russian uranium hexafluoride, palladium and fertilizer. On Wednesday, it called the tariffs “unfair, unjustified and unreasonable,” vowing to “take all actions necessary to protect its national interests.”
However, New Delhi knows that any further escalation would hurt it in matters beyond trade, the sources said. Unlike China, India does not have leverage like supplies of rare earths to force Trump’s hand to improve the terms of any trade deal, they said.
Successive US administrations over the past few years, including Trump’s first term, carefully cultivated relations with India with an eye on it as a vital partner in long-term efforts to counter the growing might of China.
However, analysts say Trump’s recent moves have plunged the relationship back to possibly its worst phase since the US imposed sanctions on India for nuclear tests in 1998.
“India is now in a trap: because of Trump’s pressure, Modi will reduce India’s oil purchases from Russia, but he cannot publicly admit to doing so for fear of looking like he’s surrendering to Trump’s blackmail,” said Ashley Tellis, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who was a senior national security official in the administration of former US president George W. Bush. “We could be heading into a needless crisis that unravels a quarter century of hard-won gains with India.”
Indian state refiners have in recent days stopped buying Russian oil as discounts narrowed and pressure from Trump rose, Reuters has reported.
NEW CHALLENGES
Analysts say that a more pressing challenge for India is the stark divergence between its priorities and Trump’s political base on key issues such as work visas for tech professionals and the offshoring of services. India has long been a major beneficiary of US work visa programs and the outsourcing of software and business services, a sore point for Americans who have lost jobs to cheaper workers in India.
Relations with India risk becoming a “football in American domestic politics,” said Evan Feigenbaum, a former senior US Department of State official during the George W. Bush administration.
“Issues that directly touch India are among the most partisan and explosive in Washington, including immigration and deportation, H1B visas for tech workers, offshoring and overseas manufacturing by US companies, and technology sharing and co-innovation with foreigners,” he wrote on LinkedIn.
Since a 2008 deal to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology, the two countries have deepened intelligence sharing and defense cooperation and expanded interactions with Australia and Japan through the Quad grouping aimed at containing China’s dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.
However, fractures have appeared, despite Modi’s rapport with Trump in his first term and then with former US president Joe Biden. Images in February of Indians deported by the US on military planes, their hands and legs shackled, horrified the country just days before Modi went to see Trump, seeking to stave off high tariffs. The relationship was also seriously tested in late 2023 when the US said it had foiled a plot with Indian links to kill a Sikh separatist leader on US soil. New Delhi has denied any official connection to the plot.
“The Modi regime’s credibility in the US has gone down,” said Sukh Deo Muni, a former Indian diplomat and a professor emeritus at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University. “And maybe there are people who think that India or Modi had to be brought back on track, if not taught a lesson. And if that trend continues, I’m quite worried that the challenge is quite powerful and strong for India to navigate.”
US RIVALS
One Indian government source said India needs to gradually repair ties with the US, while engaging more with other nations that have faced the brunt of Trump tariffs and aid cuts, including the African Union and the BRICS bloc that includes Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa. India is already making some moves with Russia and China. Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to visit New Delhi this year, and on Tuesday, Russia said the two countries had discussed further strengthening defense cooperation “in the form of a particularly privileged strategic partnership.”
India has also boosted engagement with China, a change after years of tensions following a deadly border clash in 2020. Modi is set to visit China soon for the first time since 2018.
“Russia will attempt to exploit the rift between the US and India by proposing the restoration of the Russia-India-China trilateral and new projects in defense,” said Aleksei Zakharov, a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. “India will undoubtedly be mindful of structural factors such as sanctions against Russia and will seek to find a compromise with the Trump administration.”
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