President William Lai’s (賴清德) potential US stopovers and Washington’s tariff policies on Taipei have become focal points in the countries’ bilateral relations in the past six months since US President Donald Trump took office.
Significantly differing from his first term, Trump’s foreign policy this time around has primarily focused on trade aggression, which has complicated Taiwan-US relations. However, the Lai administration has maintained a consistent stance toward the US and remained cooperative to build mutual trust.
In the past few years, the White House has repeatedly emphasized that relations with Taiwan are at their best in history, a tone that remains unchanged this year.
After US Secretary of State Marco Rubio last month met with Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅), Rubio stressed that Lai’s potential transit was not on the agenda. Clearly, China does not regard the president’s potential transit as the most pressing issue, and it would be a mistake to conclude that Lai is destabilizing trilateral relations among Taiwan, the US and Taiwan.
Lai’s decision to halt his travel plans, which could include stopovers in the US, reduces the risk of Taiwan becoming a bargaining chip in the trade talks between Washington and Beijing and uncertainties for the US in the negotiation process. However, Taiwan should not be an option at the negotiation table to begin with.
As stated in former US president Ronald Reagan’s “six assurances,” the US would not seek a mediation role in cross-strait negotiations. Therefore, any attempt to link Lai’s potential US transit with US-China trade talks would go against the principle of the “six assurances.”
Taiwan has secured a temporary tariff rate and better terms than China, indicating that the US is not bundling issues revolving around Taiwan and China together.
However, the real challenge for Taipei would be the uncertainties in Washington’s diplomatic officials’ appointments. The national security adviser position remains vacant, with Rubio temporarily filling the role. Many key officials handling Taiwan and China policy in the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense have yet to be appointed and are unlikely to be confirmed until the end of next year. Only until then would the Trump administration’s policy in the Indo-Pacific region and strategy toward China take shape.
If Lai were to make stopovers in the US amid such uncertainty, it would be difficult to seek channels of dialogue, especially with the Trump administration preoccupied with tariffs. Postponing visits demonstrates Taipei’s sensitivity to Washington’s priorities, a gesture likely to be appreciated.
Nevertheless, solidifying diplomatic ties with allies in South America remains a crucial part of Taiwan’s foreign policy. It would be inevitable for the president to visit the allies and make stopovers in the US.
Given Trump’s decisive role, Lai could consider bringing a delegation of high-level business leaders with him during his potential US transit. That would convey a message that Taiwan is not only investing in diplomatic allies, but also in the US, in a language that would be more understandable to Trump.
Having industry leaders in the delegation would enable Washington to better understand Taipei’s perspective on tariffs, while also raising Taiwan’s visibility and level of interaction in the US. That would perhaps be the best approach for presidential US transits.
Michael Lin is a doctoral student in National Taiwan University’s Department of Political Science.
Translated by Fion Khan
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