In the policy paper “National Security Strategy 2025” released by the British government on Tuesday last week, Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait are mentioned multiple times. Emphasizing the importance of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait in global trade and supply chains, it said that their stability is of strategic significance to the UK.
The paper stated the UK’s position: People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should resolve their differences through peaceful and constructive dialogue, and the UK opposes any form of military threats or coercion.
The UK does not support any unilateral attempts to change the “status quo” and is committed to deepening its cooperation with Taiwan, including collaboration in areas such as trade, education and technological innovation, it said.
The paper showed a more explicit and proactive UK stance on Taiwan, integrating it into the UK’s broader security and Indo-Pacific strategies. This was a shift from previous diplomatic ambiguity: The UK’s growing concern over China’s rise is now concretely reflected in its policy documents.
On the same day, British Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs David Lammy addressed the British House of Commons on China policy, reiterating that the UK’s position on Taiwan remains unchanged and affirming continued efforts to bolster bilateral cooperation.
Regarding the British Royal Navy’s HMS Spey’s transit of the Taiwan Strait on June 18, Lammy said it was in defense of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Lammy also signaled that the UK would likely carry out more such deployments.
This move demonstrated the UK’s commitment to freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region and signaled a firm stance on the Taiwan Strait issue, countering China’s unilateral attempts to undermine regional peace and stability.
Through naval operations and policy articulation, the UK is actively engaging in regional strategy. This aligns with the British government’s vision for “Global Britain” and offers a security policy model for other European countries grappling with how to respond to China’s expansionist posture.
Elliot Yao is a reviewer.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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