The Legislative Yuan on Tuesday passed the third reading of amendments to the Pay Act of the Armed Forces (軍人待遇條例), raising the monthly allowance for voluntary military service members to NT$30,000 from the current NT$15,000. These adjustments are to take effect on Jan. 1 next year.
When I graduated from the military academy and was promoted to second lieutenant, my monthly salary — including base pay, professional allowance and volunteer service allowance — was NT$42,000. At that time, I served as a platoon leader of a combat unit, and was required to stay on base 24 hours a day save for holidays. My hourly pay amounted to just NT$50.
However, several salary adjustments have been implemented in the years since, increasing the base pay and professional allowance. Most notably, President William Lai (賴清德) in April significantly increased military allowances, bringing the total monthly salary of a young second lieutenant to more than NT$58,000.
Now that the Legislative Yuan has passed another allowance increase of NT$15,000, a second lieutenant’s salary could exceed NT$73,000. By implementing such significant salary increases, are they implying that military personnel should get no days off, remaining on standby 24 hours a day, seven days a week?
In the past, being on duty 24 hours per day made it extremely difficult for military personnel to care for their families. Sometimes, soldiers were even unable to attend the funerals of close friends or relatives due to combat-readiness missions, which led many of us to feel it might be better to resign altogether.
Today, with allowance adjustments in response to inflation and Lai’s emphasis on the welfare of soldiers, military personnel enjoy pay and benefits better than those of regular civil servants. We retired veterans cannot help but feel envious — like we were born in the wrong generation.
This substantial increase in the allowance for voluntary military service members would undoubtedly fill the wallets of volunteer soldiers — perhaps these measures would even attract more young people to join the military.
However, higher salaries alone would not be enough to sustain such interest in the long term. If new recruits find that military life does not meet their expectations, they could choose to resign early, thereby wasting all of the investments in their training and professional development.
Furthermore, with soldiers receiving such high monthly salaries, the public would place higher expectations on the military and hold it to much stricter standards. This could make it difficult for military personnel to take leave, much less look after their families.
Additionally, increasing the allowance for voluntary military service would significantly raise personnel costs and squeeze the national defense budget. This could negatively impact the military’s capacity for weapons procurement and logistics maintenance.
As a member of the military, I am delighted to see improvements in the benefits and treatment of our nation’s armed forces. However, salary adjustments should be made over time and in line with inflationary trends and the compensation of civil servants.
Is it fair to expect civil servants and other public-sector employees to accept that military personnel should be given preferential treatment? These circumstances would only serve to worsen division in society.
Chen Hung-hui is a military instructor and university life resources officer.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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