President William Lai (賴清德) on Sunday called for cross-party support for a special budget to bolster Coast Guard Administration (CGA) facilities to counter China’s “gray zone” tactics.
The coast guard, which would be mobilized for military duties in the event of war with China, is also routinely sent out to shadow Chinese ships during Beijing’s war games around Taiwan.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus on Sunday said it supports the plan to bolster territorial defense, but added that funding for the CGA should be included in the special defense budget plan that is to be reviewed in the next legislative session.
The special budget should be used to tackle challenges brought by US tariffs, it said.
It remains to be seen whether the KMT would block attempts to allocate a larger budget to the CGA, but the caucus’ comments on Sunday might raise concerns. There have already been a number of bills passed by the KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) — who together hold a legislative majority — which the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were critical of and failed to block.
The DPP has also levied allegations that the KMT and TPP have taken actions that support the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “united front” efforts against Taiwan. The most recent example was when Chinese state-run media published a hit piece on DPP Legislator Puma Shen (沈伯洋), which the KMT responded to by citing the Chinese article to raise questions about Shen’s loyalty to Taiwan.
At a news conference on Monday, Shen accused the two parties of colluding with pro-China elements to block US arms purchases and undermine the whole-of-society defense program by targeting the nonprofit civil defense organization Kuma Academy.
Getting all parties on the same page over defense is going to be a monumental task for Lai, but cooperation on the issue is imperative to ensure Taiwan can defend itself against an increasingly aggressive CCP. Crucial to those efforts would be bolstering the CGA.
The CGA would be the first line of defense against the China Coast Guard (CCG), the responsibilities of which extend far beyond the defense of China’s coastal waters. Since 2018, the CCG has reported directly to the Chinese People’s Armed Police, which in turn reports to China’s Central Military Commission.
In 2021, China revised its Maritime Traffic Safety Law, requiring foreign vessels to apply for permits and inform the country’s maritime authorities before entering its territorial waters. That sounds reasonable on paper, but in practice is cause for great concern among China’s neighbors in East and Southeast Asia, as China claims the entire portion of the South China Sea that falls within its “nine-dash line” — a claim it enforces. The CCG is also not a typical coast guard fleet — it is a formidable force comprising a large number of well-armed vessels.
“China has the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world, with over 150 regional and ocean going patrol vessels that weigh more than 1,000 tons in displacement in service,” Newsweek wrote on March 28 citing a Pentagon report.
What makes the CCG’s size and scope particularly concerning — especially when taken together with China’s overreaching maritime law — is that China takes actions that fall just short of war while encroaching on Taiwan’s sovereignty. China claims Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and it considers itself justified in taking actions within those waters to protect what it sees as its own sovereignty. This is the crux of China’s “gray zone” tactics — other countries are reluctant to respond with their navies for fear of escalating or being seen as the aggressor.
Taiwan must bolster the CGA to the best extent possible so that it can respond effectively in kind when it encounters harassment. A strong coast guard would allow Taiwan to meet China at sea and defend itself in a timely manner, so that other forces are not caught off guard.
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