Debates in Taiwan over the clash between former US President Donald Trump and Harvard University have generated no shortage of commentary, analysis and emotion. As a US citizen observing from a distance, I fully understand the desire to engage with developments in the US. However, I would caution against allowing such distant controversies to dominate the public discourse in Taiwan, especially given the far more pressing challenges closer to home.
The issues in the US — polarization, institutional credibility and elite accountability — are real, but so is the US’ capacity to confront them. With a population of more than 330 million, a GDP exceeding US$27 trillion and an unmatched network of global alliances, the US is built to withstand internal crises. Its geographic size, diversity and layered democratic institutions give it the strategic depth to self-correct. Criticism from overseas, no matter how well-intentioned, is unlikely to shape its domestic evolution.
Taiwan’s situation is markedly different. It is a small, exposed democracy confronting an existential threat from one of the world’s most powerful authoritarian regimes. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) pressure campaign extends beyond military threats to include economic coercion, political infiltration and cognitive warfare. Unlike the US, Taiwan lacks the luxury of distraction.
While criticism of institutions such as Harvard might reflect valid concerns, it risks diverting attention from urgent national imperatives. These include investing more significantly in national defense — potentially more than 5 percent of GDP — accelerating asymmetric warfare capabilities, countering CCP influence operations and bolstering democratic resilience from within.
From the outside looking in, Taiwan faces a critical strategic moment. The focus of its intellectual, political and civil society communities would be better directed at fortifying the nation’s sovereignty and preparing for contingencies that could define its future.
Just as the US’ challenges must be resolved by Americans, similarly, Taiwan’s problems can only be addressed by Taiwanese themselves.
The US would continue to debate and resolve its internal issues in its own time and way. However, Taiwan cannot afford to misplace its priorities. The stakes are too high, the threats too real and the timeline too uncertain.
Simon Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton, who lectures on international relations.
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