On May 13, the Legislative Yuan passed an amendment to Article 6 of the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act (核子反應器設施管制法) that would extend the life of nuclear reactors from 40 to 60 years, thereby providing a legal basis for the extension or reactivation of nuclear power plants.
On May 20, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) legislators used their numerical advantage to pass the TPP caucus’ proposal for a public referendum that would determine whether the Ma-anshan Nuclear Power Plant should resume operations, provided it is deemed safe by the authorities. The Central Election Commission (CEC) has approved the proposal, and the vote is to be held on Aug. 23.
According to the revised second paragraph of Article 6, the licensee may apply to the competent authority for a license renewal before the current license expires. Under a newly added third paragraph, “when there is need to continue operation after the license is expired, an application for renewing the license thereof shall be filed by the licensee with the competent authorities within the period prescribed by the competent authorities.” However, operations may only continue after the competent authority has reviewed and approved the plant’s final safety analysis report. In short, all three of Taiwan’s old and decommissioned nuclear power plants are now legally eligible to apply for license renewal and thus, reactivation.
The decision to apply for a license extension or reactivation lies with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Taiwan Power Co (Taipower), and the Nuclear Safety Commission is the competent authority responsible for approving or denying the application. However, the revised article of the act does not mandate that the economics ministry or Taipower submit an application.
The main text of the TPP’s referendum proposal asks: “Do you agree that the Ma-anshan Nuclear Power Plant should resume operations, provided it is deemed safe by the relevant authorities?” This is ridiculous for a number of reasons.
First, as determining whether the already decommissioned Ma-anshan plant can resume operations requires it being deemed safe and approved by the competent authorities — what is the point of holding a referendum on this issue? Furthermore, exactly which items would be reviewed by the Nuclear Safety Commission? What procedure would be followed? These details remain unclear as we await the release of subsidiary regulations — and yet, the KMT and the TPP are rushing to hold a nationwide referendum on the matter.
Former CEC head Chen In-chin (陳英鈐) recently wrote on Facebook that “whether the Ma-anshan Nuclear Power Plant should resume operations is an administrative issue that requires a case-by-case review and approval in accordance with regulations. Holding a referendum on the plant’s potential reactivation violates the principle of separation of powers, as such a matter cannot be solely decided by a vote indicating public support or opposition.”
Second, the decision whether to approve the plant’s continued operation must comply with legal requirements. Article 30 of the Referendum Act (公民投票法), which states that if a referendum proposal is passed, “the president or the competent authority shall take the actions necessary to implement the content of the referendum proposal.” However, if those actions do not meet legal criteria, the referendum cannot compel the president or the competent authority to act unlawfully. In other words, if reactivating the Ma-anshan plant is illegal, then its operations cannot be resumed. This would mean that the upcoming referendum would essentially have no legal binding force — it would merely be an expression of public opinion.
The main text of the referendum does not require that Taipower submit an application to renew the power plant’s license if passed. Seeing as it is entirely consistent with the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act, is it necessary to spend NT$1.1 billion (US$36.75 million) to hold a vote on such an unclear referendum? Chen believes that, while current regulations can be subject to initiatives or referendums, this case falls under the authority of the Legislative Yuan and should not be determined by a major policy referendum — it can only be initiated by citizens through a public petition.
Shieh Jyh-cherng is a retired National Taiwan University professor.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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