As Taiwan faces an increasingly assertive China and the specter of a cross-strait conflict grows, the 2025 defense budget has introduced significant cuts that reverberate across Taiwan’s force posture — nowhere more worryingly than in Penghu County. The Ministry of National Defense’s decision to reduce Penghu’s garrison by 15 percent — more than 1,000 troops — comes as the island’s strategic value is greater than ever. The move, driven by demographic and economic factors, risks undermining Taiwan’s war-fighting preparedness at the very location that could decide the outcome of a Chinese invasion.
Penghu’s position in the Taiwan Strait makes it a linchpin in the defense of Taiwan proper. For the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Penghu is not just another outlying island — it is a critical stepping stone for any large-scale amphibious or heliborne assault on Taiwan proper. The archipelago’s airfields, harbors, and proximity to China and Taiwan’s western coast mean that, if seized, Penghu could serve as a forward base for PLA helicopters, drones and amphibious forces, enabling rapid and sustained attacks on Taiwan’s heartland.
The loss of Penghu would dramatically shorten the PLA’s logistical tail, provide a staging area for further assaults, and potentially cut off Taiwan from outside support.
Yet, the 2025 defense budget reduces the Penghu garrison from 7,185 to just more than 6,000 soldiers. That is a serious blow: While the PLA is rapidly modernizing and rehearsing joint island-seizure operations, Taiwan is thinning its frontline defenders at the most vital choke point.
Given such realities, Taiwan must urgently reconsider its force allocation. Consider two interlinked measures:
First, the military should consider a major reduction of Taiwanese troops stationed in Kinmen County. Kinmen has long been a symbol of Taiwan’s frontline resolve, but symbolism cannot substitute for operational logic.
The islands lie just 2km from Xiamen, China — well within the range of PLA artillery, missiles and drones. In the event of conflict, the 3,000-strong garrison would be vastly outgunned and isolated, with little realistic hope of reinforcement or resupply. The PLA could neutralize Kinmen in hours, if not minutes, with overwhelming firepower and electronic warfare, rendering its defense militarily infeasible.
Moreover, the operational value of Kinmen for Taiwan’s overall defense is limited. The islands are not stepping stones for defending Taiwan proper, nor do they provide significant early warning or depth against a PLA assault. Instead, they risk becoming a costly tripwire — drawing Taiwanese forces into a doomed defense that saps resources from where they are truly needed.
Second, instead of maintaining a large, vulnerable garrison in Kinmen, Taiwan should redeploy at least 2,000 troops to Penghu. That would restore Penghu’s garrison to its previous strength, offsetting the budget cuts and bolstering the island’s layered defenses. The additional troops — ideally including mechanized infantry, air defense units and special forces — would enhance Penghu’s ability to withstand a PLA assault, delay enemy advances, and buy precious time for reinforcements or allied intervention.
Such a redeployment would also send a powerful signal to Beijing: Taiwan is not wasting its limited military personnel on symbolic outposts, but concentrating its defenses where they matter most. By reinforcing Penghu, Taipei would complicate PLA planning, increase the cost of any invasion and strengthen deterrence.
Some might argue that reducing Kinmen’s garrison risks inviting a PLA attack, but the operational reality is clear: Kinmen, to which the US’ Taiwan Relations Act does not apply, cannot be held against a determined PLA assault. Its proximity to China makes it indefensible in modern warfare, and its loss would not directly threaten the security of Taiwan proper.
Beijing also has strong political and strategic reasons to avoid invading Kinmen and, similarly, Lienchiang County (Matsu).
First, the islands have little operational value for a main assault on Taiwan. Seizing them would not provide a useful springboard for attacking Taiwan proper, nor would it significantly degrade Taiwan’s overall defense.
Second, an unprovoked attack on Kinmen or Matsu could backfire diplomatically. It would hand Taipei a powerful political rationale to declare independence for a “Republic of Taiwan,” galvanizing international support and potentially triggering a broader crisis that Beijing might wish to avoid.
By contrast, Penghu’s loss would be a game changer, militarily and politically. That is why it must be prioritized above all other outlying islands.
Taiwan’s defense resources are finite, and the stakes are existential. The 2025 defense budget’s cuts to Penghu’s garrison are a dangerous gamble that must be reversed. By reducing the troop presence in Kinmen by 2,000 and shifting those forces to Penghu, Taiwan could shore up its most critical front line, maximize its war-fighting potential and send a clear message of resolve to Beijing.
This is not about abandoning Kinmen — it is about recognizing hard military truths and making the tough choices required for national survival. The future of Taiwan could well hinge on whether Penghu stands or falls. Let us ensure it stands strong, ready and resolute.
Masahiro Matsumura is professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka.
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