This month’s midterm elections in the Philippines delivered mixed results, with three of the available 12 senate spots going to people on the Duterte slate and two to candidates endorsed by impeached Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte. That gives the pro-Duterte camp five victories. Two of the candidates were initially part of the senatorial slate of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s administration, but shifted their alignment during the final month of campaigning. Overall, even following repeated political setbacks in the run-up to the election, the Dutertes have reasserted their influence in national politics.
The elections delivered a weaker showing for the Marcos administration than was predicted by pre-election surveys. The administration’s winning candidates includes four veteran politicians and one radio personality. That also gives the pro-Marcos camp five victories.
However, early surveys had administration candidates dominating the race, with many in the top six positions. That did not happen. That is a loss for the Marcos administration, as voters cast protest ballots or were disillusioned by infighting within the former Duterte-Marcos alliance.
The outcome favored the traditional opposition that presented itself as a third option for disaffected voters unwilling to support the Duterte or Marcos camps. The traditional opposition had a good showing with returning senators finishing strong at second and fifth place respectively, which was unexpected based on pre-election surveys.
The results have produced a more unpredictable senate composition. There is now a three-block division in the senate with the Marcos and Duterte camps, plus the traditional opposition. However, political loyalties are always uncertain in Philippine politics. As of now, Sara Duterte is a popular candidate in the lead-up to the 2028 presidential elections.
With the newly elected senators, who are to take their seats in June, the pro-Duterte camp would have nine possible votes, while the pro-Marcos camp would have seven possible votes.
However, despite past alliances, Philippine politics is not black and white, and coalitions are bound to change.
As for the traditional opposition, they now have three senate seats. Aside from them, the critical bloc of swing votes has possibly five senators. That group could affect decisions in the upper chamber.
A key item on the Philippine Senate docket is the impeachment trial of Sara Duterte. While the impeachment itself targets her, the underlying battle is one of political dominance, with Marcos aiming to consolidate control over all branches of government.
For Marcos, the real objective is not just a conviction — it is ensuring that the Senate is a reliable partner in governance. While not openly committed to his camp, senators often adopt pragmatic positions. If Marcos secures a few more allies, his administration could secure the 16-vote threshold needed for critical decisions, impeachment or otherwise.
Marcos has managed to carve out influence among traditionally independent or re-electionist senators. Unlike the side of Duterte, Marcos has built a more flexible coalition — one that blends old-guard political figures with pragmatic newcomers.
However, his camp is far more unstable. How well this will work out is still to be determined. That more than likely would create further divisions and challenges for the remaining three years of the Marcos administration.
The Philippine government last month began easing restrictions on engagement with Taiwan, allowing high ranking government officials to interact with their Taiwanese counterparts. In a rare public statement, the issue of Taiwan was acknowledged as an area of concern by the chief of the Philippine military. These are small, but substantive changes that indicate a more pragmatic attitude toward working with Taiwan. If it is to continue, support from the Philippine Senate is crucial.
Besides having the power to concur treaties and international agreements, the Senate has budgetary power and investigative oversight on diplomatic missions and defense agreements. The Marcos administration has shown a greater willingness to work with other US allies in the region and has supported a more assertive stance on geopolitical issues. For these to be institutionalized beyond his term, Senate support is needed.
Additionally, being a smaller body, at 24 members, the Senate has the power to influence national discourse and opinions on sensitive issues such as Taiwan. The electoral results could mean a difficult path ahead for Taiwan-Philippine relations.
Marvin Hamor Bernardo is a researcher in the Strategic Studies Program of the University of the Philippines’ Center for Integrative and Development Studies. Covie Paulo Ronquillo is a political science graduate from De La Salle University in Manila, and a youth leader. He is pursuing his master’s degree in international studies at National Chengchi University. Karen Yu is an international studies graduate of National Chengchi University and a youth leader working for the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation as an assistant research fellow.
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