As US tariffs begin to reshape global trade flows, many countries are worried that a tsunami of discounted Chinese goods, originally destined for the US, would hit their shores. To keep them out, especially as recessionary pressures mount, some might be inclined to impose their own tariffs on Chinese imports. In that case, China would be cut off entirely from international trade, delivering an unexpected victory for US President Donald Trump, who would undoubtedly claim credit for this new Great Wall.
To avert this scenario, China must pursue short-term policies that align with its long-term goal of building a global governance architecture for a multipolar world. China harbors no illusions that it would be the 21st century’s hegemon. India would inevitably become a superpower by mid-century. Europe might also join their ranks as Trump’s might-is-right worldview seems poised to accelerate and deepen European integration.
The Sino-American standoff seemingly reflects a shared understanding that avoiding the Thucydides Trap — when tensions between an incumbent hegemon and a rising power lead to conflict — would require an eventual agreement on respective spheres of influence.
Both sides’ defensive efforts to expand their global reach have devolved into a crude form of imperialism. Trump has designs on Canada, Greenland, Panama and Gaza, while China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea have brought its maritime border to the doorstep of several Southeast Asian countries.
However, it remains to be seen how the trade war would factor into this contest. The tariffs that the US and China imposed against one another have effectively decoupled their trade. Will countries hit by his “reciprocal” tariffs be cowed into joining the US sphere of influence as part of bilateral trade deals?
The answer is no, so long as China respects its trade partners’ right to befriend all superpowers. In such a scenario, the benefits of trading with China remain too large to forgo, but to take advantage of these benefits and maintain their autonomy, middle powers would need to pursue multilateral cooperation.
As a first step, middle powers must convince China that it is in its long-term interest to stop the potential fire sale of goods intended for the US market, which means voluntary export restraints.
However, the Chinese government must also focus on boosting domestic consumption by lowering income and value-added taxes, expanding social-welfare programs (especially for health care, childcare and pensions), and easing the hukou household registration system — which regulates access to social services — in major coastal cities.
Moreover, China can generate higher demand for services by attracting more foreign tourists and students, and by incentivizing Chinese tourists to travel domestically. To cushion the adjustment pains and lower the budget deficit in the medium term, China should double down on supply-side structural reforms and overhaul the financial sector, which would unleash new productive forces.
For example, if market-driven medium-sized private banks were permitted to emerge, they could nurture the employment-intensive small and medium-sized enterprises that large state-owned banks have traditionally discriminated against.
Loosening capital controls would also support the renminbi’s internationalization to the status of the US dollar and Shanghai’s emergence as a global financial center on par with London and New York.
The escalating US-China trade war and the competing technological standards that stem from deeper geopolitical fragmentation, would cause substantial damage to middle powers. Being forced into a sphere of influence would erode these countries’ sovereignty and limit their export markets. To avoid becoming pawns in a proxy war, middle powers should form a union of independent buffer states based on the same principles as the UN and WTO.
Members of ASEAN, together with Japan and South Korea, should propose an Atlantic-Pacific Sustainability Pact (APSP) to the EU and the UK. Practicing open regionalism, APSP would have three main tasks. The first would be to create a free-trade area that is open to all countries, with an eye to building the biggest possible integrated market. ASEAN members, Japan and South Korea could then merge the main Asia-Pacific trade agreements under the economic umbrella of APSP.
The second task would be to institute a nonpartisan peace caucus in the UN and other global and regional forums to prevent tensions between the US and China (as well as Russia) from impeding international coordination on shared global problems such as climate change and pandemics.
Last, APSP would do well to establish a development agency whereby richer members could provide technical and financial support to poorer members’ efforts to achieve net zero greenhouse-gas emissions, protect their biodiversity and accelerate economic growth. This would offset the assistance that competing superpowers use to influence poor countries.
As ASEAN economies catch up with those in the Global North, their combined GDP could equal that of the EU and the UK by 2045. In such a scenario, APSP’s economic might would be so great that the US and China would have to join the trade partnership or else risk defeat from self-isolation.
Cooperative multilateralism is middle powers’ best hope for mitigating the fallout from the Sino-American cold war, and it might even eventually crowd out the conflict. At a minimum, cooperative multilateralism by middle powers would ensure peaceful global governance as the international order transitions from a unipolar world to a multipolar world.
Wing Thye Woo, professor emeritus of economics at the University of California, Davis, is university chair professor at the China Economic Research Institute at Liaoning University, a visiting professor at the University of Malaya and a research professor at Sunway University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) were born under the sign of Gemini. Geminis are known for their intelligence, creativity, adaptability and flexibility. It is unlikely, then, that the trade conflict between the US and China would escalate into a catastrophic collision. It is more probable that both sides would seek a way to de-escalate, paving the way for a Trump-Xi summit that allows the global economy some breathing room. Practically speaking, China and the US have vulnerabilities, and a prolonged trade war would be damaging for both. In the US, the electoral system means that public opinion
They did it again. For the whole world to see: an image of a Taiwan flag crushed by an industrial press, and the horrifying warning that “it’s closer than you think.” All with the seal of authenticity that only a reputable international media outlet can give. The Economist turned what looks like a pastiche of a poster for a grim horror movie into a truth everyone can digest, accept, and use to support exactly the opinion China wants you to have: It is over and done, Taiwan is doomed. Four years after inaccurately naming Taiwan the most dangerous place on
In their recent op-ed “Trump Should Rein In Taiwan” in Foreign Policy magazine, Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim argued that the US should pressure President William Lai (賴清德) to “tone it down” to de-escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait — as if Taiwan’s words are more of a threat to peace than Beijing’s actions. It is an old argument dressed up in new concern: that Washington must rein in Taipei to avoid war. However, this narrative gets it backward. Taiwan is not the problem; China is. Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions
Wherever one looks, the United States is ceding ground to China. From foreign aid to foreign trade, and from reorganizations to organizational guidance, the Trump administration has embarked on a stunning effort to hobble itself in grappling with what his own secretary of state calls “the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted.” The problems start at the Department of State. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has asserted that “it’s not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power” and that the world has returned to multipolarity, with “multi-great powers in different parts of the
RSS