Over the past decade, artificial intelligence (AI) and critical mineral technologies have redefined global geopolitics and geoeconomics. While these advances offer transformative opportunities, they also bring about significant strategic vulnerabilities.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — comprising the US, India, Japan and Australia — has evolved from a maritime security grouping into a vital platform for countering China’s growing dominance and predatory practices in the domain of critical and emerging technologies.
Since the establishment of the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group in 2021, the coalition has prioritized technology cooperation as a means of achieving strategic autonomy from China. Initiatives like the Track 1.5 dialogue on Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN) signal Quad’s intent to build alternatives to China’s hegemonic role in 5G and beyond. Notably, pilot Open RAN deployments in Palau, training efforts at the Asian Open RAN Academy in the Philippines and India’s plans to open a first-of-its-kind Open RAN workforce training initiative with the US’ support mark a pivot toward a more integrated and inclusive Indo-Pacific digital infrastructure.
The Quad’s portfolio has also broadened with programs such as AI-ENGAGE and BioExplore, which aim to leverage AI for agricultural innovation and biodiversity research respectively. These efforts suggest a conscious move toward development-oriented tech diplomacy.
However, the long-term viability of these projects hinges on the Quad’s ability to decouple strategically from China’s vertically integrated tech supply chains.
China’s dominance in the critical mineral supply chain represents a central challenge to the Quad’s ambitions. The country processes 60 percent of the world’s lithium and an overwhelming 85 percent of rare earth elements — materials essential for manufacturing advanced electronics, electric vehicle batteries and military systems. Through export controls on materials like gallium and germanium, China has already demonstrated its willingness to leverage this dominance for geopolitical ends. Further compounding the issue is Beijing’s assertive push to shape global technology standards through initiatives like the “China Standards 2035” and its growing influence in bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union, the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission. Without a counterbalancing strategy, the Quad risks operating in a global ecosystem defined by China-centric standards and protocols.
Despite converging concerns over China, internal asymmetries continue to undermine the Quad’s collective tech agenda. Divergent data governance policies remain a major obstacle. India’s rejection of Japan’s Osaka Track on cross-border data flows, for instance, reveals underlying trust and sovereignty issues. Meanwhile, bilateral AI investment among India, Australia and Japan remains negligible, with each country more economically enmeshed with China than with one another.
This lack of internal cohesion is exacerbated by the disproportionate reliance on the US as the technological and financial anchor of the grouping. While the US is the primary research collaborator for all three partners, intra-Quad tech partnerships remain shallow. For instance, the bilateral AI investments between the three are less than 1 percent. Bridging this gap is essential if the Quad aims to move beyond rhetorical alignment toward actual technological synergy.
While bilateral efforts — such as US-India cooperation on mineral processing, Japan’s investments in India and Australia’s rare earth sectors, and the US-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement — are encouraging, they remain fragmented. Harmonizing these bilateral agreements under a Quad-wide strategic framework could amplify their impact. A unified Quad critical minerals pact, anchored in common standards and incentives for joint ventures, would position the coalition to reduce dependency on China more effectively.
Each Quad member has distinct technological strengths. India’s software talent, Japan’s hardware innovation, Australia’s raw material reserves and the US’ research-and-development infrastructure together form a potent value chain — if integrated effectively.
The deployment of privacy-preserving machine learning could also help overcome the data localization deadlock by enabling cross-border data analysis without compromising individual privacy — a vital step for collaborative AI innovation.
Despite the Quad’s growing momentum, dismantling China’s tech dominance will require sustained political will, coordinated investment and strategic patience. Given China’s deep integration in global supply chains, short-term decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable.
However, reducing strategic overdependence is possible and essential.
The upcoming Quad summit in India presents a timely opportunity to consolidate progress and expand collaboration. Engaging tech-forward democracies such as Taiwan and South Korea as auxiliary partners could help create a broader coalition capable of influencing global technology governance.
To outmaneuver China in the race for technological supremacy, the Quad must transition from fragmented bilateralism to a coherent multilateral framework. This requires not only pooling material resources, but also aligning values, standards and long-term objectives. Only through a combination of internal coherence and external coalition-building can the Quad shape a resilient, inclusive and secure technological future.
Rahul Mishra is a senior research fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance at Thammasat University in Bangkok. He is also an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Prisie L. Patnayak is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies.
On Sept. 3 in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rolled out a parade of new weapons in PLA service that threaten Taiwan — some of that Taiwan is addressing with added and new military investments and some of which it cannot, having to rely on the initiative of allies like the United States. The CCP’s goal of replacing US leadership on the global stage was advanced by the military parade, but also by China hosting in Tianjin an August 31-Sept. 1 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which since 2001 has specialized
In an article published by the Harvard Kennedy School, renowned historian of modern China Rana Mitter used a structured question-and-answer format to deepen the understanding of the relationship between Taiwan and China. Mitter highlights the differences between the repressive and authoritarian People’s Republic of China and the vibrant democracy that exists in Taiwan, saying that Taiwan and China “have had an interconnected relationship that has been both close and contentious at times.” However, his description of the history — before and after 1945 — contains significant flaws. First, he writes that “Taiwan was always broadly regarded by the imperial dynasties of
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will stop at nothing to weaken Taiwan’s sovereignty, going as far as to create complete falsehoods. That the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never ruled Taiwan is an objective fact. To refute this, Beijing has tried to assert “jurisdiction” over Taiwan, pointing to its military exercises around the nation as “proof.” That is an outright lie: If the PRC had jurisdiction over Taiwan, it could simply have issued decrees. Instead, it needs to perform a show of force around the nation to demonstrate its fantasy. Its actions prove the exact opposite of its assertions. A
A large part of the discourse about Taiwan as a sovereign, independent nation has centered on conventions of international law and international agreements between outside powers — such as between the US, UK, Russia, the Republic of China (ROC) and Japan at the end of World War II, and between the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since recognition of the PRC as the sole representative of China at the UN. Internationally, the narrative on the PRC and Taiwan has changed considerably since the days of the first term of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic
RSS