Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has just concluded a strategically significant tour of Southeast Asia, with stops in Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia. This high-profile diplomatic mission was designed to reinforce Beijing’s image as a provider of regional stability and economic certainty, amid volatile global geopolitics and as US-China competition continues to define the international landscape.
Xi’s visit underscores China’s deepening ties with Southeast Asia, even as disputes over the South China Sea and suspicions of Chinese influence continue to affect regional perceptions.
His first stop was Hanoi on Monday last week, where he was welcomed with full state honors by Vietnamese President Luong Cuong. His meeting with Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam was particularly symbolic, as the two countries emphasized their shared ideological roots and economic interdependence.
Xi declared that China and Vietnam were “sources of valuable stability and certainty” in a “turbulent world” — a message clearly aimed at regional audiences and Western critics. Several memoranda were signed, including agreements on supply chain cooperation and a joint railway project, while Xi pledged to expand market access for Vietnamese agricultural products in China.
Despite deep-rooted mistrust and ongoing maritime tensions, Vietnam continues to balance economic pragmatism with strategic caution. US tariffs have nudged Hanoi toward engagement with Beijing, even as it bolsters ties with Washington and regional partners.
Xi’s second destination, current ASEAN Chair Malaysia offered an opportunity to promote China’s broader regional agenda. Arriving in Kuala Lumpur on Tuesday last week for a three-day visit, Xi focused on trade liberalization, connectivity and China’s role in ASEAN affairs.
Malaysia is a crucial partner in shaping regional economic and political dialogue. Discussions reportedly centered around an upgraded free trade agreement between China and ASEAN, aimed at further reducing tariffs and expanding areas of cooperation.
ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn told Chinese state media that many tariffs would be reduced to zero under the revised agreement, a move intended to deepen integration and stabilize supply chains.
Malaysia has long been a key partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, hosting infrastructure projects like the US$11.2 billion East Coast Rail Link. China is Malaysia’s largest trading partner and a top source of foreign direct investment.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim visited China three times since taking office in November 2022, reflecting the depth of the bilateral relationship. Xi’s visit reaffirmed these ties, while sending a message to the wider region: Despite Western skepticism of its intentions, Beijing remains committed to Southeast Asia’s development.
Despite tensions over South China Sea claims and resource exploration, Malaysia prioritizes economic interests. Anwar’s government engages the US and China to balance ties and avoid great power rivalry.
Xi’s final stop, in Cambodia on Friday, was the most ideologically aligned leg of the tour. China and Cambodia have long shared close political and economic ties, and Xi’s visit only deepened that relationship. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the “Diamond Cooperation Framework” — a strategic partnership between China and Cambodia that deepens collaboration across politics, economics, agriculture, energy and people-to-people exchanges — and accelerating the development of the “Industry and Technology Corridor” and the “Fish and Rice Corridor.” Thirty-seven cooperation documents were signed, on education, health, trade, youth engagement and agriculture.
Xi reaffirmed support for Cambodia’s “strategic autonomy,” contrasting Western emphasis on reforms. Like Vietnam and Malaysia, Cambodia faces steep US tariffs over suspected Chinese transshipments. Xi condemned protectionism, urging Southeast Asian unity for globalization and open markets, challenging the resurgence of “Trumponomics.”
Indeed, Xi’s Southeast Asia tour can be seen as the opening salvo in a broader Chinese response to the resurgence of economic nationalism in the US.
The re-emergence of US President Donald Trump on the political stage has injected uncertainty into global trade, but for Beijing, this moment presents both a challenge and an opportunity. By positioning China as the anchor of stability, Xi seeks to draw a contrast with what Beijing portrays as the erratic and self-serving US policy.
Analysts have framed Xi’s charm offensive as a deliberate attempt to reshape the regional narrative.
As Sharon Seah observed in The State of Southeast Asia: 2025 Survey Report — an annual poll by Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute that gauges the attitudes of Southeast Asian elites on geopolitical trends — China retains considerable weight in regional strategic assessments, even if trust remains fragile.
The survey showed that 52.3 percent of respondents would align with the US over China if forced to choose, a shift from last year, when China had a slight edge.
However, trust in China has increased, rising from a low of 19 percent in 2021 to 36.6 percent this year, while distrust has dropped significantly. That ambivalence reflects Southeast Asia’s nuanced view of China: it is economically indispensable, but politically unpredictable.
While countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand rank China as the region’s most strategically relevant partner, concerns remain over Chinese interference in domestic affairs, coercion in the South China Sea, and the use of tourism and trade as tools of political leverage.
Xi’s visits might help China solidify its role as the region’s top economic partner, but winning hearts and minds would require more than infrastructure and investment. Beijing must address the underlying anxieties of its neighbors, particularly on issues of sovereignty, transparency and respect for regional norms. If it can do so, China might yet tilt the regional balance in its favor. If not, the US would continue to be seen as the more trustworthy strategic partner, even amid its own domestic unpredictability.
The US is not focusing on wooing ASEAN for now and is dealing with each member on a bilateral basis according to its economic preferences. ASEAN has decided not to retaliate and is trying to work out a way forward. There is strategic space for the US in ASEAN, but that has yet to be tapped by the Trump administration.
India is closely observing the deepening ASEAN-China ties, and its own policy might show some changes in nuance toward China, but its strategic engagement with the US remains qualitatively more advanced than its relations with either China or ASEAN.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia and ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.
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