There are moments in history when America has turned its back on its principles and withdrawn from past commitments in service of higher goals. For example, US-Soviet Cold War competition compelled America to make a range of deals with unsavory and undemocratic figures across Latin America and Africa in service of geostrategic aims. The United States overlooked mass atrocities against the Bengali population in modern-day Bangladesh in the early 1970s in service of its tilt toward Pakistan, a relationship the Nixon administration deemed critical to its larger aims in developing relations with China. Then, of course, America switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979 in service of a Cold War strategy to gain advantage over the Soviet Union.
America appears to be shifting again now toward an amoral foreign policy direction under President Donald Trump. Trump has suggested, for example, that the United States should assert control over Panama, Greenland, and Canada. He also has argued that he must end the war in Ukraine, and normalize relations with Russia, even if doing so requires naked capitulation to Putin’s desires. Previously, when the United States exempted itself from principles and commitments, it did so for clearly defined objectives. What makes this moment unique, however, is that Trump’s motives are somewhat murky.
For example, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has explained that Trump’s focus on securing a ceasefire in Ukraine and normalizing relations with Russia is driven by a desire to execute a “reverse Kissinger,” in other words, pull Russia closer to the United States to isolate and weaken China. Somewhat differently, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth has signaled that the United States needs to wind down conflict in Ukraine to shift resources away from Europe to focus on Asia. Still others in the United States have advocated for dispensing with Ukraine to get on to the business of building a new global architecture around the concept of spheres of influence, whereby strong powers such as China, Russia, and the United States dictate the destinies of smaller powers along their peripheries. According to this logic, Russia would be allowed to rebuild a sphere of influence along its European periphery, the United States would reassert its sphere of influence in Latin America, and America presumably would tolerate China asserting control over its periphery. And yet other Americans have argued that Trump’s desire to end wars abroad is animated by an instinct to focus more on problems at home, a goal that is shared by a solid majority of the American public.
Then there is the question of Trump’s ambition to expand America’s boundaries. Trump’s supporters argue that this desire for expansion is ingrained in the American spirit. According to this logic, Trump needs to grow America to help diffuse societal divisions at home and give purpose and progress to the American people. Trump’s opponents argue that the president’s covetousness over other countries’ territories reflects ignorance, hubris, and a clumsy attempt at legacy-building.
The key point of this review is to highlight that there is no unified theory for explaining the Trump administration’s statements or actions. Neither Trump nor his advisors can come up with a coherent explanation that ties Trump’s impulses into any semblance of a grand strategy. In fact, the Trump administration is comprised of a set of senior officials with divergent viewpoints on global affairs. Some advocate for America to rebuild primacy as a unipolar power. Others believe the United States must use its finite resources to prioritize protecting its interests in Asia. Yet others urge greater restraint in the exercise of American power abroad. There also are traditional business types who advocate for Trump to focus on getting better deals for American companies and workers.
Trump sits above his advisors as an arbiter between competing camps. Some days Trump will side with those arguing for prioritizing Asia. Other days he will be swayed by the need to restrain the use of American power abroad. Trump himself is not rigid or ideological. He is opportunistic and improvisational.
For Taiwan, this means there will not be any moment of clarity when clouds part and Trump’s designs for the future of Asia come into focus. In fact, Trump and his advisors will seek to keep Taiwan off-balance and uncomfortable as part of their effort to urge Taiwan to take on a greater burden for its own security. There are no appeals to ideological alignment or shared values that will sway Trump to support Taiwan. The most powerful argument to Trump is that his ambitions for reindustrializing America are not achievable without the critical inputs that Taiwan’s leading companies provide. On the flip side, Taiwan’s security also hinges on a strong relationship with the United States. This creates a dual dependency that both sides must manage for mutual self-interest.
Trump is not a security hawk on China. He has pledged to the American people that he will stand firm on China, but also that he will make deals with Xi Jinping (習近平) and keep America out of war. Trump will look unfavorably on any uptick in cross-Strait tensions that he perceives as being triggered by Taipei. This creates a strong incentive for President William Lai (賴清德) to be a steady steward of cross-Strait relations and to deprive Beijing of any excuses for escalating tensions. Lai cannot halt Beijing’s growing military and grey zone pressure, but he can work to persuade the world that such bullying is not being provoked by actions or statements emanating from Taipei.
During this moment of flux, perhaps the most important work Taiwan’s leaders can undertake is at home. They need to find points of convergence between competing political parties. Taiwan’s divided political system means that no party will get all of what it wants. The leading political parties face a choice between compromise and failure. If they fail to compromise on how much and how urgent of a threat China poses, as well as on critical questions around defense spending, energy security, economic resilience, and the proper level of government funding to meet societal and security needs, the only party that would gain would be Beijing. Beijing benefits from political division and dysfunction inside Taiwan. The people of Taiwan do not.
America’s diplomatic shift shrinks Taiwan’s margin for error. Taiwan’s leaders have agency, though. Here’s to hoping Taiwan’s political leaders harness external turbulence to focus even more on finding compromises to serve Taiwan’s long-term interests.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.
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