Although Indonesia does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the two sides have established close ties in the economic and sociocultural sectors.
Indonesia is one of the priority countries among the 16 partner nations of Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy. To assert its presence and build a positive image in Indonesia, Taiwan needs to optimize its soft power as a means of engagement, given the political limitations.
However, compared with other East Asian countries such as South Korea and Japan, Taiwan’s soft power strategy has not yet achieved the same level of success. South Korea’s approach through the Hallyu Wave and Japan’s use of anime and sushi have proven effective in winning the hearts of the Indonesian public and enhancing the positive image of both countries.
So, what efforts has Taipei made to promote its soft power in Indonesia? What areas need improvement in these efforts?
One key consideration in utilizing soft power is strategic relevance, meaning that not all of Taiwan’s soft power assets should or can be promoted. This strategy requires the ability to identify a target audience, select the appropriate soft power elements to leverage and tailor them to the Indonesian context. Taiwan has several standout soft power assets that hold potential for further development, such as halal tourism, education, agriculture and gastrodiplomacy.
First, halal tourism. The Taiwanese government continues to build Muslim-friendly infrastructure, such as prayer rooms at tourist sites, universities and train stations. It also encourages Taiwanese companies to produce halal-certified products and certifies halal restaurants. These efforts aim to accommodate the needs of Muslim travelers visiting Taiwan.
Unfortunately, Taiwan is still less popular among Indonesians compared with tourist destinations such as Japan and South Korea, despite Taiwan offering extraordinary natural beauty beyond the urban sights of Taipei, including Sun Moon Lake, Yangmingshan National Park, Yehliu Geopark, Taroko Gorge, Alishan National Forest, Beitou Thermal Valley, Heping Island Geopark and Shifen Waterfall.
To achieve the target of 500,000 Indonesian tourists visiting Taiwan, the government could develop Muslim-friendly travel packages that combine history, nature and local culture. Additionally, the government could collaborate with key opinion leaders to promote potential tourist destinations among Indonesians. Implementation of the Travel Authorization Certificate, which replaces visas in some cases, further simplifies travel for Indonesians visiting Taiwan.
Second, education. Taiwan offers scholarship programs for formal and non-formal degrees, including undergraduate, graduate, doctoral and fellowship programs, as well as Mandarin-language courses.
Taipei Economic and Trade Office data show that there are 16,725 Indonesian students studying in Taiwan, making Indonesia its second-largest source of foreign students. The majority of them are pursuing degrees in engineering, business, management or information technology.
Taiwan should also promote social science majors such as political science, sociology, international relations and economics.
Investing in education and scholarships is valuable because graduates eventually become professionals holding key positions. Creating a database of Taiwan’s alumni categorized by their areas of expertise is crucial. Taiwan can leverage the alumni network as a bridge to expand cooperation with Indonesia.
Third, agriculture. Taiwan is known for its advancements in agriculture, which aligns with Indonesia’s needs as an agrarian country. Through the Taiwan Technical Mission, Taiwan and Indonesia have been collaborating in the agricultural sector since 1976 to enhance productivity and the quality of Indonesia’s agriculture. Cooperation has taken place in South Sulawesi, Karawang and North Sumatra, focusing on training farmers, increasing production capacity, and improving packaging and marketing. The collaboration is expected to expand to other agricultural regions in Indonesia.
In line with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s priority on food security, the cooperation would not only boost Indonesia’s agricultural productivity, but also improve the marketability of its products, benefiting farmers’ livelihoods.
Finally, gastrodiplomacy. Taiwanese cuisine has entered the Indonesian market and is well-received, including products such as bubble tea, xiaolongbao (小籠包, steamed soup dumpling) and crispy chicken. Beyond these, Taiwan could introduce other traditional dishes by involving the public in the cooking process.
In Indonesia, the South Korean government has aggressively promoted its traditional culture, including food, through events such as kimchi festivals and kimbap cooking contests, which have garnered significant public interest. Taiwan could adopt a similar approach, for example, by organizing festivals focused on making beef noodle soup, pineapple cakes, nougat biscuits, Taiwanese mochi and so on.
To reach different regions in Indonesia, Taiwan could collaborate with local governments, private-sector partners and local restaurants to hold Taiwanese culinary festivals, which would increase awareness among rural people toward Taiwanese cuisine.
These four key sectors could serve as Taiwan’s focus in implementing soft power diplomacy in Indonesia. Taiwan must adopt creative strategies to cultivate its own unique appeal and increase its recognition among the Indonesian public, otherwise it would struggle to compete with the soft power success of South Korea and Japan.
Marina Ika Sari is a coordinator and researcher at The Habibie Center in Jakarta.
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