The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama has become one of the most crucial levers for China’s control over Tibet. To understand why, it is essential to examine the deep religious, cultural and political significance of that institution within Tibetan society and how Beijing perceives its connection to broader governance goals.
The Dalai Lama is not just a religious leader, but a unifying figure for Tibetans worldwide. For centuries, the Dalai Lama has embodied spiritual guidance and political leadership, deeply intertwined with Tibetan national identity. The 14th Dalai Lama’s international stature has enabled him to advocate for Tibetan autonomy and cultural preservation on the global stage — often in ways that conflict with Beijing’s vision of Tibet as an inseparable part of China.
China views the Dalai Lama’s influence, particularly among Tibetans, as a challenge to its authority. Beijing’s strategy of controlling the selection of the next Dalai Lama is thus not only a way to manage internal dissent, but also a means to ensure Tibet’s integration into China.
China has framed its involvement in the reincarnation process as a continuation of historical traditions, citing Qing Dynasty practices. While the narrative of historical legitimacy is debatable, what is clear is that controlling that process enables Beijing to shape the spiritual leadership of Tibetan Buddhism. By managing who the next Dalai Lama is, the Chinese government could neutralize the figure’s potential to challenge state authority.
That control extends to shaping perceptions. A state-backed Dalai Lama could become a figure who promotes Beijing’s narrative, aligning Tibetan Buddhism with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies and priorities. In turn, that could weaken the influence of Tibetan exile communities and movements advocating for autonomy or independence.
Beyond Tibet, the Dalai Lama’s international role complicates China’s foreign relations. Many nations, particularly Western democracies, view the Dalai Lama as a symbol of peaceful resistance and human rights. His continued global presence underscores the ongoing issue of Tibet’s status. By controlling reincarnation, China can signal to the world that it has resolved the Tibetan question, making the Dalai Lama a less contentious figure in diplomacy.
That strategy fits into China’s broader approach to managing religion. Whether it is appointing CCP-aligned bishops in Catholic communities or influencing other religious institutions, Beijing seeks to ensure that spiritual leadership aligns with state ideology. The reincarnation process is a continuation of that policy — designed to harmonize Tibetan Buddhism with what it calls “socialist values.”
While Beijing’s logic might seem clear, it is not without risks. Tibetan communities might reject a state-appointed Dalai Lama, leading to greater divisions and potentially intensifying resistance. A splintering of Tibetan Buddhism, with one Dalai Lama in exile and another in Tibet, could undermine the institution itself, creating unintended consequences for Beijing.
Controlling the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama is a cornerstone in Beijing’s strategy to assert dominance over Tibet. By leveraging the process, it aims to solidify its political control, align Tibetan Buddhism with state interests and reduce the global influence of the Tibetan cause. However, such a move is fraught with complexity, as it challenges deeply held beliefs and risks further alienating the people it seeks to govern. Whether the strategy would succeed in the long term remains an open question, but its implications for Tibet and global geopolitics are undeniably significant.
Khedroob Thondup is a former member of the Tibetan parliament in exile.
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