Earlier signs suggest that US President Donald Trump’s policy on Taiwan is set to move in a more resolute direction, as his administration begins to take a tougher approach toward America’s main challenger at the global level, China. Despite its deepening economic woes, China continues to flex its muscles, including conducting provocative military drills off Taiwan, Australia and Vietnam recently.
A recent Trump-signed memorandum on America’s investment policy was more about the China threat than about anything else. Singling out the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a foreign adversary directing investments in American companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies, it said that “PRC-affiliated investors are targeting the crown jewels of US technology, food supplies, farmland, minerals, natural resources, ports and shipping terminals.”
The memorandum has proposed imposing several economic restrictions — from stopping US companies and investors from investing in industries that advance Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy to preventing “PRC-affiliated persons from buying up critical American businesses and assets.”
More broadly, in seeking to end the Ukraine war, Trump has made clear his administration’s intent to shift the US strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, a pivotal region that is likely to shape the new world order. As US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it, Europe must take “responsibility for its own security” so that the US prioritizes “deterring war with China in the Pacific.”
The White House’s blunt message is that Europe, reliant on the US for its security, must shape up before many of the more than 100,000 American troops stationed there begin to be shipped out for likely deployment in the Indo-Pacific. Referring to China, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said, “In the Indo-Pacific, they are trying to drive us out.”
Meanwhile, a recent subtle but potentially significant change in the state department fact-sheet on Taiwan has attracted much attention, with Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) welcoming the “support and positive stance on US-Taiwan relations demonstrated in the relevant” document.
The state department dropped a highly symbolic phrase from its updated Taiwan fact-sheet. The fact-sheet from the previous administration of President Joe Biden had stated, “We do not support Taiwan independence.” This sentence was removed. And in another tweak to the previous US position, the new administration, while cautioning against “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side,” stated that it advocates a resolution of the Sino-Taiwan issue by “peaceful means, free from coercion.”
Rubio later said in a TV interview that, “We are against any forced, compelled, coercive change in the status of Taiwan.” Asked how the US under Trump would respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Rubio stated, “America has existing commitments that it has made to prevent that from happening and to react to it, and that would be executed on.”
Against this backdrop, the US under Trump is less likely to stand idly by if China were to invade Taiwan. Unlike his predecessor Biden, who projected weakness partly because of his frail health, Trump claims to be a strong leader. Indeed, he has repeatedly asserted that, had he been the president in 2022, Russia would not have invaded Ukraine.
Effective deterrence, however, requires a credible US threat, backed up by requisite military deployments, of imposing significant costs on China if it attacks Taiwan.
A comprehensive strategy involving military, diplomatic, economic and information-warfare measures is necessary to deter Chinese aggression and maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. If deterrence were to fail, forcing the US to respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the resulting war between the US and a near-peer adversary, as Rubio admitted, “would be a terrible thing for the world, and it would be a bad thing for China too.”
A multifaceted US-led strategy to deter a Chinese attack should include stepped-up arms sales to Taipei, building greater military interoperability with Taiwanese forces, strengthening Taiwan’s cybersecurity defenses and helping Taiwan to develop asymmetric warfare capabilities against China, while America increases the frequency and visibility of its military patrols in the Taiwan Strait and the wider region.
Strategic clarity to put China on notice should include clear and unambiguous statements that the US will defend Taiwan in the event of an attack, as well as high-level diplomatic visits to Taipei to demonstrate American support and commitment. The US must also help counter Chinese disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining Taiwan’s democracy and eroding support for Taipei in the international community.
According to a recent Chinese foreign ministry statement, “Gaza belongs to the Palestinians and is an integral part of the Palestinian territory.” But likewise Taiwan belongs to the Taiwanese and is integral to their territorial rights, distinct identity and democratic freedoms.
Biden’s troubled legacy left the Trump administration a mess in Ukraine and difficult policy choices on China’s aggressive expansionism. The only real winner from the Ukraine war has been China, which dwarfs Russia in terms of economic output, military spending and other material measures.
The last thing Trump would want is his legacy to be defined by failure to deter an overt Chinese aggression against Taiwan. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would not only shatter Trump’s image as a strong leader but also undermine his “Make America Great Again” movement. In this light, extricating the US from the Ukraine war and prioritizing deterrence against China make strategic sense.
Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
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