The first Donald Trump term was a boon for Taiwan. The administration regularized the arms sales process and enhanced bilateral ties. Taipei will not be so fortunate the second time around. Given recent events, Taiwan must proceed with the assumption that it cannot count on the United States to defend it — diplomatically or militarily — during the next four years.
Early indications suggested otherwise. The nomination of Marco Rubio as US Secretary of State and the appointment of Mike Waltz as the national security advisor, both of whom have expressed full-throated support for Taiwan in the past, raised hopes that America would prioritize Taiwan’s security. Indeed, a number of the National Security Council’s Asia staffers are noted champions of US-Taiwan relations.
No doubt these figures will do their best to advocate for an approach to Taiwan consistent with American principles, one which prioritizes the de facto independence of a democratic state that materially contributes to American prosperity and American security. Yet they are likely to find themselves running uphill.
Recent developments in the president’s approach to Ukraine are illuminating. First, the dispatch of a team to Saudi Arabia to negotiate directly with Russia, and without Ukraine, an end to the war suggests an approach to international diplomacy that is nine decades past its sell-by date. This effort lends credence to the idea that Trump conceives of a world divided into spheres of influence, in which the local big dogs — Russia, the United States, and, yes, China — get to do as they wish.
There is little reason to think the president will not adopt a similar approach to Asia. Were Trump to negotiate away arms sales to or diplomatic support for Taiwan — let alone attempt to impose a cross-Strait settlement on Taipei that had been negotiated with Beijing — it would mark a fundamental rejection of both the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, and thus of the American One China Policy as a whole. That policy has not been ideal for Taiwan, but it has contributed meaningfully to Taiwan’s security and prosperity over the past five decades.
Second, the aftermath of Trump’s disastrous Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky points to an unfortunate truth: the national interest is the not the most important driver when it comes to the American president’s foreign policy decisionmaking. His personal emotions are much more decisive. Taipei cannot count on the American president to make a dispassionate assessment of pros and cons in determining how best to engage with Taiwan and with China. Should someone whisper in the president’s ear that President William Lai Ching-te (賴清德) has been insufficiently grateful for American support, the US-Taiwan relationship could find itself in an unexpected crisis.
Third, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Trump’s nominee to serve as the under secretary of defense for policy, Elbridge Colby, echoing earlier calls from the president, said that Taiwan should be spending 10 percent of gross domestic product on defense (approximately US$77 billion) and that “we need to properly incentivize them.” Taiwan needs to spend more on defense, but this is utterly unrealistic. Taiwan would not be able to spend that much money annually on defense even if it wanted to. There is currently a US$22 billion backlog on American deliveries of already-purchased arms and Taiwan’s own defense industry would quickly find itself overstretched by additional orders amounting to tens of billions of dollars. The 10 percent target is not encouragement to spend more; it is an escape clause designed to give Trump an excuse to abandon Taiwan.
Colby also argued that ending the war in Ukraine would allow the United States to focus its attention and resources on Asia. Such an outcome could benefit Taiwan. Unfortunately, the president has never said anything to that effect. Until Trump says otherwise, it is safer to expect he will adopt an approach to Asia that has much in common with his approach to Europe — treat with China as a peer and leave Asian countries on their own to deal with Asian problems, including Taiwan.
What should Taipei do? It should work quietly with Trump officials well-disposed to Taiwan to advance shared priorities. It should ramp up defense spending as rapidly as possible. And it should invest in ties to Japan, Australia, and others concerned about its fate.
But mitigating risks will not eliminate them. These are dangerous times for Taiwan. During a period in which the Chinese threat is growing more urgent, Taipei cannot count on its foremost partner to show up during a time of need. Perhaps Trump really is gearing up to prioritize security challenges in Asia. Perhaps he really is intent on keeping Taiwan out of China’s hands. At this particular moment in time, the evidence suggests otherwise.
Michael Mazza is a senior director at the Project 2049 Institute and a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.
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