Advanced chips and Chinese threats have made Taiwan mainstream in Europe. Despite Beijing’s objections, the EU and its member states have ties with the nation under various so-called “one China policies.” Careful formulations have allowed EU capitals to balance Beijing’s demands and their own interests.
More European officials than ever find themselves poring over the nuances of their countries’ “one China” policies, once a niche issue. At the same time, Beijing has begun a global campaign to wipe away all nuance of individual countries’ own policies in favor of pretending consensus in support of its full irridentist claims. The latest example is Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi’s (王毅) distortions about UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 during his Two Sessions news conference this month.
The stakes are higher than ever. Conflict could wipe out 10 percent of the world economy. Simultaneously, Taiwan’s position as a geopolitical, technological and economic node means Europe cannot afford to ignore Taipei. A lack of understanding of the policies risks triggering unconscious concessions to Beijing or an unexpected backlash affecting the whole EU.
That is why I wrote a report for the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research to explain Europe’s “one China” policies and suggest a shared European baseline.
Beijing claims that Taiwan is an integral part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This is its so-called “one China principle,” that there is “one China” in the world, Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and the PRC is China’s sole legitimate government. The Chinese government has in recent years sought to mobilize UN bureaucracy and countries around the world to falsely claim there is a consensus in support of its principle.
However, for decades it was happy to let countries get away with not fully accepting Beijing’s claims. Instead, countries would come to a compromise unique to their bilateral relationships with the PRC. Each EU member state has its own “one China” policy. They vary substantially.
My report shows that European states’ “one China” policies have developed in five waves. During the Cold War, western European countries were extremely careful in what they did and did not concede. It was only in the past two waves after the end of the Cold War that more European capitals thoughtlessly gave in to Chinese demands. Some began acknowledging Beijing claims to Taiwan, while others gave in to a pressure campaign to blame Taipei for trouble.
When leaders did not pay attention, they surrendered diplomatic freedom of movement they did not know they had.
However, the history of European Taiwan policy is normally one of seeking a balance. On the one side is the power and pull of a resurgent China and the damage it can do to both European and Taiwanese interests. On the other side are European countries’ interests in ties with Taiwan and having the right to determine their own foreign policies.
It is up to each country’s political leaders to strike that political balance.
However, they should do so without placing Beijing’s “one China” demands before their own national interests. A country’s “one China” policy reflects its calculation of its own interests. It thus might go further than China is comfortable with. Officials need to understand the difference between Beijing’s principle and their own policy.
Chinese diplomats continuously seek to push for new concessions. When one country gives in, it weakens other countries’ resistance.
Taiwan will show up more often in EU deliberations. Pressure to take a clear-cut position will grow, not just from Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) or US President Donald Trump, but also from the practical reality of international relations. The diversity of “one China” policies in Europe has advantages because of the variety of engagement options it offers.
However, the disadvantages are growing.
Complete unification of EU member states’ approaches is impossible and undesirable, but some degree of convergence is necessary. All European countries need to speak up for international law, protect the space for substantive interactions with Taiwan and not pre-emptively surrender to Beijing’s “one China” principle.
In return, potentially costly actions in support of Taiwan should only be pursued in concert, weighing if the political burden can be carried long-term.
In return, member states should allow their neighbors space for further constructive engagement that they wish to pursue. This way, important interaction with Taiwan can go ahead, while EU states can expect support from their fellow member states if legitimate actions trigger a Chinese response.
Sense Hofstede is a postdoctoral researcher for ReConnect China at Ghent University. He is an expert in the influence of the Chinese party state on Beijing’s foreign policy, cross-strait politics and the international relations of the Indo-Pacific region. He previously worked as a lecturer at Leiden University and a research fellow at the Clingendael Institute after completing a doctorate in Comparative Asian Studies at National University of Singapore.
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