An undersea communications cable serving Penghu County was severed, with a Chinese-owned vessel suspected of causing the damage, the Ministry of Digital Affairs said on Tuesday.
The Coast Guard Administration, upon receiving a report from Chunghwa Telecom, began to monitor the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 168 (宏泰168) freighter anchored near the cable, the coast guard said in a news release. The incident occurred less than two months after an undersea cable off the coast of Keelung was apparently cut by the Chinese-owned, Cameroon-flagged ship Shunxin-39 (順興39).
The two incidents represent the type of “gray zone” tactics China engages in to put pressure on Taiwanese authorities and erode public morale in Taiwan, while falling short of actions that would justify retaliation.
The same is true of China’s deployment of drones and balloons over waters near Taiwan, which have become more frequent over the past year.
Analysts have suggested military aims for these actions as well. The Diplomat on Jan. 17 reported that China might seek to cause an “Internet blackout” in Taiwan by cutting undersea cables prior to an annexation attempt, as suggested by the outcome of a tabletop war game exercise late last year.
Others have said that the deployment of drones and balloons might be an attempt to draw fire from Taiwanese forces so that China could pinpoint where defense systems are deployed. Another suggested that the balloons are gathering meteorological data that could improve the accuracy of potential Chinese missile strikes on targets within Taipei or its surroundings.
Following Tuesday’s incident, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokeswoman Zhu Fenglian (朱鳳蓮) said that damage to undersea cables were a “common maritime accident,” which occur more than a hundred times a year globally, the Straits Times reported.
“While the basic facts and the people responsible for the accident have not yet been clarified, the Democratic Progressive Party authorities have deliberately exaggerated the situation in an attempt at political manipulation, which will not enjoy popular support,” it cited her as saying.
For Zhu to immediately go on the offensive more convincingly implicates the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and conveys to Taiwanese authorities that similar incidents are to be expected, for which Taiwan should prepare itself.
Herein lies the crux of the issue: The CCP is unsophisticated in its strategies. There is a Chinese idiom commonly attributed to former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平): “Conceal your strengths and bide your time” (韜光養晦). Clearly, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has learned nothing from his forerunner.
The CCP regularly reveals its cards, and gives Taiwan ample time to adapt. When it began swarming Kinmen County with civilian drones (which it did in place of using military drones, seemingly as a way of retaining plausible deniability), the Taiwanese military simply invested in anti-drone systems. When China began holding drills off Taiwan’s east coast, Taiwan installed missile defense systems in hidden locations in Taitung and Hualien counties. Now, in response to attacks on its submarine cables, Taiwan has announced that it would invest in microwave transmitters and other backup systems.
The simple fact of the matter is that China continues to employ “gray zone” tactics, because more than 75 years after the end of the Chinese Civil War, it still lacks the ability to take Taiwan by force.
“Taiwan’s west coast has shallow waters extending from most of its beaches, meaning they are not ideal for an invading force, [while] its east coast is lined by cliffs that are too steep for an invading force to scale,” the Council on Foreign Relations wrote on June 12 last year.
Taiwan should rest assured that Chinese attacks on its undersea cables demonstrate China’s weakness, but should take the opportunity to strengthen its resilience.
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