China’s assertion of power in the South China Sea has been a gradual yet systematic process. From building military outposts on artificial islands to deploying its vast maritime militia, Beijing has ensured that it is the most formidable presence in these waters.
Satellite imagery over the past decade has shown rapid militarization of the Spratly (Nansha, 南沙群島) and Paracel (Xisha, 西沙群島) islands, with airstrips, radar installations and missile batteries reinforcing Chinese claims. These developments have provided Beijing with a forward-operating capability, allowing it to monitor and potentially deter any challenge to its authority.
With plans for an underwater research facility, China is extending its reach below the surface. The “cold seep” ecosystem research station, scheduled for completion by 2030, would be one of the most advanced deep-sea facilities ever built. The ability to sustain a six-member crew for a month at great depths signifies China’s advancements in marine technology.
Officially, the facility is being promoted as a scientific research center, yet its strategic significance cannot be overlooked. Establishing a permanent presence at such depths would allow China to further assert its maritime claims, conduct undersea surveillance and potentially gain a tactical advantage in submarine warfare.
As China consolidates its hold over the South China Sea, the role of external powers — particularly the US — becomes increasingly crucial in shaping the regional balance.
However, with US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Washington’s approach to the issue might shift significantly. Trump’s first term showed a preference for economic conflict over military entanglements, particularly in Asia. With his return, it is likely that the US would prioritize trade disputes with China over direct involvement in maritime disputes. This would be a stark contrast to former US president Joe Biden, who emphasized strengthening alliances with Indo-Pacific partners to counterbalance China.
Should the US turn its focus away from the South China Sea, it would leave a significant vacuum that China would be more than willing to fill. While Washington has historically maintained freedom of navigation operations in the region, those efforts alone have done little to curb Beijing’s expansionist agenda. Without sustained diplomatic and military engagement, China’s position in the South China Sea would only become stronger.
Among Southeast Asian nations, only the Philippines has remained vocal in opposing China’s actions in the South China Sea. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has pursued a more assertive stance compared with his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, by strengthening ties with the US and advocating for regional resistance against Beijing’s unilateral moves.
However, the rest of ASEAN appears more inclined toward cooperation with China rather than confrontation.
Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam have expressed concerns over China’s expansive claims, yet their responses have been cautious. Beijing remains a crucial trading partner and investor for many ASEAN states, offering infrastructure development, trade agreements, and financial assistance through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative. As a result, most Southeast Asian countries find themselves balancing economic benefits with territorial sovereignty, often opting for diplomacy over direct opposition.
This passive approach has allowed China to assert its influence with minimal resistance. While ASEAN leaders continue to voice support for international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, their actions suggest a quiet acceptance of China’s dominance. This raises a critical question: Has China effectively won control over the South China Sea?
Despite China’s growing influence, the pursuit of a legally binding code of conduct remains essential. The long-standing negotiations between China and ASEAN over a code have made limited progress, largely due to Beijing’s reluctance to accept binding terms that would constrain its actions.
However, if ASEAN hopes to maintain any semblance of regional autonomy, it must push for a stronger consensus.
The effectiveness of ASEAN has often been undermined by its consensus-based decisionmaking model, which can lead to indecisiveness.
For a code of conduct to materialize as a meaningful framework, ASEAN must demonstrate unified leadership.
The question remains: Who would take up this mantle?
Indonesia, as the largest economy in Southeast Asia and a traditionally neutral player, has the potential to lead these discussions. Vietnam, with its history of resisting Chinese encroachment, could also play a crucial role in rallying regional support for a more robust agreement.
While on paper Southeast Asian nations continue to oppose China’s claims in the South China Sea, the geopolitical reality tells a different story. With China’s military and technological advancements, coupled with the region’s economic dependence on Beijing, resistance has been minimal. The return of Trump to the White House might further weaken US engagement, allowing China to tighten its grip on the region unchallenged.
Despite this, the region’s future is not set in stone. ASEAN still has an opportunity to assert itself through collective diplomacy and a robust code of conduct.
However, whether the region’s leaders would rise to the challenge is uncertain. As China continues to expand its presence, the question remains: Has Beijing already prevailed in the South China Sea?
Only time will tell.
Dion Maulana Prasetya is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang in Indonesia.
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