US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House once again brings forth the “America First” principle. His administration’s policies, marked by a rejection of multilateral commitments — such as withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and the WHO — symbolize his skepticism toward international cooperation. Amid global uncertainties, these moves carry significant implications for the international order, particularly in Southeast Asia.
Historically, Southeast Asia has long been a geopolitical battleground between major powers, especially the US and China. From the perspective of realism, which emphasizes the importance of power and national interests in international relations, the “America First” approach reinforces the logic of zero-sum politics.
This approach prioritizes national interests over international cooperation, thereby exacerbating regional competition and instability, especially concerning territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
The US’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the WHO and the cutting of the US Agency for International Development indicate a shift in focus toward domestic interests at the expense of global responsibilities. This move weakens multilateral support for addressing pressing global issues such as climate change, public health crises and international development.
For Southeast Asian nations, this shift necessitates alternative forms of cooperation, either through regional integration or new partnerships with other powers willing to provide technical and financial assistance.
By reducing its commitment to international institutions, the US has effectively created space for China to strengthen its influence through strategic initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and regional infrastructure development. Conversely, China’s growing dominance in the region presents challenges for Taiwan.
From a liberalist perspective, which underscores the significance of cooperation, international institutions and shared norms in achieving global stability, Trump’s skepticism toward multilateralism erodes these values. In the long run, the US’ retreat from global commitments could weaken the effectiveness of international organizations in coordinating responses to common challenges.
Southeast Asian nations must now actively adapt and innovate to address these challenges regionally. This should encourage ASEAN and its member states to enhance integration, and build an independent framework for cooperation.
The economic implications of Trump’s policies cannot be overlooked. With a protectionist stance and a preference for bilateral negotiations, the US risks disrupting trade and investment flows between the US and Southeast Asian countries. From an economic liberalism perspective, free trade and market integration are fundamental pillars for maintaining regional prosperity and stability.
However, given the US’ protectionist stance, Southeast Asian countries must redirect their economic strategies toward strengthening regional cooperation through mechanisms such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ASEAN’s economic integration efforts. This situation also presents an opportunity for Taiwan to intensify its engagement with Southeast Asian nations to counterbalance China’s dominance.
From a security standpoint, regional dynamics in Southeast Asia are likely to become increasingly complex. The “America First” approach, which entails a reduced US military presence and security support in the region, creates a vacuum that other actors might seek to fill.
According to realist theory, in an anarchic international system, states must always be prepared to counter external threats by optimizing their military capabilities or forming strategic defense alliances. Thus, enhancing defense and security cooperation among ASEAN countries and with strategic partners becomes crucial.
This situation creates what is known as a security dilemma, where uncertainty regarding major powers’ security commitments drives nations to increase defense spending and seek alternative strategic alliances.
In response to the new dynamics introduced by Trump 2.0, Southeast Asian nations have several strategic options. First, they could bolster regional integration through ASEAN mechanisms to establish a collective force capable of balancing external influences.
Second, diversifying strategic relationships with multiple powers — including the US, China and the EU — would be key to avoiding overreliance on any single actor. This multilateral approach aligns with the principles of liberal institutionalism, which prioritizes cooperation and shared rules in managing international relations.
Third, regional states must invest in strengthening their defense capabilities and technological advancements as a precaution against escalating security uncertainties.
Ultimately, the impact of Trump 2.0 on Southeast Asia underscores the deep interdependence of global relations. Policy shifts in a major power can have ripple effects across regions, influencing political, economic and security dynamics elsewhere.
While these policies pose challenges, they also present opportunities for Southeast Asian nations to redefine their strategic positioning in the international system, including providing Taiwan with a chance to enhance its leverage within ASEAN countries through its vast potential for advancement.
Najamuddin Khairur Rijal is an associate professor in the International Relations Department of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at University of Muhammadiyah Malang in Indonesia.
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