US President Donald Trump has gotten off to a head-spinning start in his foreign policy. He has pressured Denmark to cede Greenland to the United States, threatened to take over the Panama Canal, urged Canada to become the 51st US state, unilaterally renamed the Gulf of Mexico to “the Gulf of America” and announced plans for the United States to annex and administer Gaza. He has imposed and then suspended 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico for their roles in the flow of fentanyl into the United States, while at the same time increasing tariffs on China by 10 percent for being the main source of fentanyl precursors. He is adding to his tariff toolkit with further levies on steel and aluminum imports.
Trump has frozen foreign aid and announced plans to disband the US Agency for International Development (USAID). He has withdrawn the US from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization (WHO) and halted America’s participation in the United Nations Human Rights Council.
On Taiwan, Trump has threatened tariffs up to 100 percent on imported semiconductor chips. He has suggested that Taiwan dramatically increase its defense spending and pay the US for providing protection, likening the relationship to one between an insurance company and its client.
This bombardment of actions and threats has caused many Western news outlets to lament that Trump has a habit of treating allies worse than adversaries. Politico magazine published an article describing Trump as pro-China, pointing to his invitation to Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) to attend his inauguration and his protection of TikTok in the US as supporting evidence.
This all begs the question, is Trump pro-China? At a deeper level, what does Trump want?
First, Trump is neither pro-China nor anti-China. He is not an advocate for democracy, nor is he an opponent of autocracy. Trump is not an ideologue. He is a lifelong dealmaker. He fervently believes Americans have been taken advantage of by the rest of the world for decades and that he must right past wrongs. He sees it as his responsibility to put Americans’ interests first.
During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump staked out a position on China that largely reflected the mood of the American electorate. Although Trump’s rhetoric is often blustery and occasionally incoherent, in the case of China, Trump consistently stressed three main themes. First, he assured the American people he would be tough on China. Second, he bragged that he knew how to negotiate with Xi and would do it better than former US president Joe Biden or former US vice president Kamala Harris. Third, he vowed to keep America out of wars.
Trump’s message reflected several truths about the American people’s views on China. First, American public attitudes on China are more negative now than at any point since the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square Massacre. Rightly or not, many Americans blame China for lost jobs and lost loved ones from the scourge of fentanyl-related deaths and the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, Americans’ top priority with respect to China is to avoid military conflict. According to polling from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 69 percent of Americans believe avoiding war should be the country’s top goal with China.
At a broader level, I believe Trump’s governing ethos can be binned within three broad baskets. First, Trump wants to create more opportunities for American workers. Trump is a jobs nationalist. He wants to generate more jobs for American workers in the US. He sees more industrial work as essential to building social cohesion and avoiding the hollowing out of America’s middle class. He also sees greater industrial production as necessary for America to avoid becoming vulnerable to Chinese coercion or aggression, given China’s vast industrial capacity. For these reasons, Trump’s goal is not to “friend-shore” supply chains to places like Vietnam, Mexico, Thailand or Taiwan. His priority is to “re-shore” production in the United States.
Second, Trump wants tighter control of everything that enters the US, both in terms of people and products. Trump promised his supporters he would halt the flow of undocumented immigrants and illegal drugs entering the country. Trump’s National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has described gaining control of US borders as the country’s top foreign policy priority.
Third, Trump wants to reduce the risk of major wars. For all his bluster and bravado, Trump is averse to military conflict and alarmed by the risk of nuclear war. He likely will seek to enlist Beijing’s support in winding down conflict in Ukraine and reducing risk of war with North Korea and Iran.
All this means that Taiwan will gain little traction with Trump by appealing to common values, democratic ideals or shared antagonisms toward China. Even so, Taiwan is an indispensable partner with the US in supporting Trump’s desire to restore American might in advanced manufacturing. If Taiwan’s leaders are looking for ways to build inroads with Trump and his advisors, they could find fertile ground by highlighting Taiwan’s current and future contributions to America’s industrial expansion, its commitment to its own defense and its responsible management of cross-strait tensions.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.
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