Advances in drone technology and its application on the battlefield are rapidly changing modern warfare, bringing important new tactical, strategic and operational innovations, with militaries across the world investing heavily in drone research, development and training to ensure they do not fall behind. With Beijing’s revisionist tendencies growing ever more obvious, Taiwan must adequately invest in drone technology to keep up with the evolving security landscape.
Drones are transforming warfare, which is particularly evident in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, with both sides prioritizing drone innovation in their search for tactical advantages. For example, Ukraine has dramatically scaled up production of high-resolution imagery uncrewed aerial vehicles to enhance surveillance. It has also invested in cheap, long-range attack drones, allowing it to conduct precision strikes on Russia’s high-value military assets.
To counter Ukraine’s innovations, Russia has focused on tactics to counter drones, such as electronic warfare, as well as procuring Iranian long-range Shahed drones, which it has used to strike civilian targets deep within Ukrainian territory.
Drone warfare is highly context-specific, as their effectiveness is tied to variations in terrain, climate and operational deployment. Military planners must factor in context-specific circumstances, including logistics, strategic goals, cultural sensitives and population density, when deciding which drones to procure and strategies to use. This is why militaries around the world are developing their own drone research and training programs tailored to their specific operational environments. For example, many NATO militaries near the arctic region are developing drones that can cope with extreme weather conditions.
The growing importance of innovation and drone technology in modern warfare makes it all the more surprising that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in alliance with the Taiwan People’s Party has frozen 30 percent of funding for a major drone research and training facility in Chiayi County’s Minsyong Township (民雄).
The budget freeze makes no strategic sense, but it is clear that other factors are behind it. The freeze is part of wider budget actions, which include hits to the defense budget, notably a 50 percent freeze on the indigenous submarine program, and a 3 percent cut to the military’s equipment and facilities budget.
This is not a strategic decision with the national interest in mind. Rather, it is part of the opposition alliance’s strategy to undermine the effectiveness of President William Lai’s (賴清德) administration and ensure it is not a success, tactics the KMT employed during former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) tenure. It puts short-term political maneuvering ahead of long-term national security.
It not only sends the wrong signal to the international community and raises questions about the nation’s commitment to national defense, but also leaves the nation unprepared to grasp the mantle of drone technology innovation.
As Arthur Chang (張崇廉), a lieutenant commander in the navy reserves, wrote in an op-ed for the Taipei Times (“Budget cuts are a threat to national security,” Feb. 10, page 8), it was the creation of the Aero Industry Development Center in 1983 — now Aerospace Industrial Development Corp (AIDC) — that enabled Taiwan to domestically produce the T-BE5A Brave Eagle Advanced Jet Trainers many years later. The KMT’s spoiler tactics for short-term gain is jeopardizing the nation’s chance to create the next AIDC of drone technology.
With the nation facing significant challenges, the KMT and the TPP should act responsibly in the public interest, refrain from unfairly undermining the executive branch and make decisions not on the basis of short-term politiking, but with Taiwan’s long-term interests in mind.
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