US president-elect Donald Trump on Wednesday said that he would not rule out military force to “take back” the Panama Canal or to take over Greenland, adding that sovereign control over those two areas is of the utmost importance to US national security.
Trump has made such statements before. He openly expressed his interest in Greenland and Panama on several occasions during his first term.
Simply put, Greenland’s strategic value to the US can be found in laying along the shortest flight paths between Europe and North America, and being the absolute best location for the US military’s deployment of ballistic missile early warning and interception systems — some of which are already deployed there. The importance of the Panama Canal is far more evident, including for naval vessels. Every day, several US Navy vessels rely on the canal to cut down on time traversing between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
As for Taiwan’s location, it possesses advantages similar to Greenland and the Panama Canal. With the Leshan radar station, we can see the airspace situation stretching from the Korean Peninsula in the north, down to the furthest islands of the South China Sea, as well as deep into inland China.
Such information is extremely important for the US’ operations of intercontinental ballistic early warning systems and interception missions in the Indo-Pacific region.
Moreover, a report by the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies in October showed that, based on trade data, about one-fifth of the world’s trade passed through the Taiwan Strait. In other words, were the Strait to come under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control, it would be tantamount to putting a chokehold on large trading powers, such as the US and Japan.
When comparing Greenland and the Panama Canal with Taiwan, it goes without saying that if Trump is insistent on his ideas for the former, then he simply cannot sit back and watch the CCP take control of Taiwan.
Huang Wei-ping works in public service and has a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Massachusetts.
Translated by Tim Smith
President William Lai (賴清德) attended a dinner held by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) when representatives from the group visited Taiwan in October. In a speech at the event, Lai highlighted similarities in the geopolitical challenges faced by Israel and Taiwan, saying that the two countries “stand on the front line against authoritarianism.” Lai noted how Taiwan had “immediately condemned” the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas and had provided humanitarian aid. Lai was heavily criticized from some quarters for standing with AIPAC and Israel. On Nov. 4, the Taipei Times published an opinion article (“Speak out on the
Eighty-seven percent of Taiwan’s energy supply this year came from burning fossil fuels, with more than 47 percent of that from gas-fired power generation. The figures attracted international attention since they were in October published in a Reuters report, which highlighted the fragility and structural challenges of Taiwan’s energy sector, accumulated through long-standing policy choices. The nation’s overreliance on natural gas is proving unstable and inadequate. The rising use of natural gas does not project an image of a Taiwan committed to a green energy transition; rather, it seems that Taiwan is attempting to patch up structural gaps in lieu of
News about expanding security cooperation between Israel and Taiwan, including the visits of Deputy Minister of National Defense Po Horng-huei (柏鴻輝) in September and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Francois Wu (吳志中) this month, as well as growing ties in areas such as missile defense and cybersecurity, should not be viewed as isolated events. The emphasis on missile defense, including Taiwan’s newly introduced T-Dome project, is simply the most visible sign of a deeper trend that has been taking shape quietly over the past two to three years. Taipei is seeking to expand security and defense cooperation with Israel, something officials
“Can you tell me where the time and motivation will come from to get students to improve their English proficiency in four years of university?” The teacher’s question — not accusatory, just slightly exasperated — was directed at the panelists at the end of a recent conference on English language learning at Taiwanese universities. Perhaps thankfully for the professors on stage, her question was too big for the five minutes remaining. However, it hung over the venue like an ominous cloud on an otherwise sunny-skies day of research into English as a medium of instruction and the government’s Bilingual Nation 2030
RSS