China’s military activity over the past year suggests it is planning for the annexation of Taiwan, the US Department of Defense wrote in an annual report published on Wednesday.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a number of options to coerce Taiwan and while an amphibious invasion would “likely strain [the PLA] and invite a strong international response,” it had conducted “realistic, large-scale” amphibious assault training last year that was “almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario,” it said.
China has been increasing missile systems along its coast facing Taiwan and moving land-based aircraft to its air force, it said, adding that Taiwan is responding by growing its defense industrial base and improving the joint operations of its forces.
In an article published by Foreign Affairs on Oct. 5, 2021, then-president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) said that Taiwan does not seek military confrontation, but would do whatever it takes to defend its democracy and way of life. As the old adage says, the best defense is a strong offense. In the past, the idea that Taiwan could target China’s Three Gorges Dam as a deterrent to a PLA attack was touted by US defense officials, and while Taipei could strike the dam with newer long-range missiles such as the Ching Tien (擎天), doing so might still not be in its best interest.
Striking the dam would not impact China’s ability to conduct warfare and given China’s record of human rights abuses against its own people, it is unlikely to be deterred by the threat of a massive death toll from a flood. Such an attack on noncombatants would also likely cause a loss of international support for Taiwan at a time when it would need assistance the most.
However, that does not mean Taiwan should abandon the idea of targeting locations in China as a potential deterrent. Taiwan could aim its missile systems at China’s large coal-fired and thermal power plants, its railway networks (particularly those that could be used to transport wartime supplies), its airports and seaports, and so on.
Taiwan has been investing heavily in its defense industry in recent years, developing new missile systems, and building submarines and high-speed corvettes for the navy. Long-range missiles could potentially be launched from those submarines and corvettes while they operate in the Taiwan Strait, as such launchers would be harder for the PLA to target.
The Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology on Tuesday said that it received an order from the navy for a domestically developed suicide drone. Such drones could be deployed and launched from fast boats or from the deck of a briefly surfaced submarine near China’s coast, sending them toward targets in Guangdong, Fujian or Zhejiang provinces.
Suicide drones are slower and carry a smaller payload, but they can loiter and be harder to detect. The small size and slow speed of a drone mean that cameras might confuse them for birds. They can also be made of radar-absorbing carbon, operating quietly using electric motors and flying close to the ground under the cover of night, making them hard to detect. Drones can incorporate autonomous systems that would allow them to continue toward their target when the enemy uses a signal jammer, and captured drones could be designed to self-destruct.
Defending Taiwan would become increasingly difficult as China strengthens its military and grows more emboldened. The nation must ensure that annexation would be very costly for Beijing by developing the capability to conduct unbridled destructive attacks on China’s key infrastructure and demonstrate the resolve to engage in such attacks.
By increasing drone and missile production and deployment, strengthening cyberwarfare capabilities, increasing its resilience through the stockpiling of resources and fortifying links with global communications networks, Taiwan can show China that an attempted invasion would be fruitless and costly.
Taiwanese pragmatism has long been praised when it comes to addressing Chinese attempts to erase Taiwan from the international stage. “Taipei” and the even more inaccurate and degrading “Chinese Taipei,” imposed titles required to participate in international events, are loathed by Taiwanese. That is why there was huge applause in Taiwan when Japanese public broadcaster NHK referred to the Taiwanese Olympic team as “Taiwan,” instead of “Chinese Taipei” during the opening ceremony of the Tokyo Olympics. What is standard protocol for most nations — calling a national team by the name their country is commonly known by — is impossible for
China’s supreme objective in a war across the Taiwan Strait is to incorporate Taiwan as a province of the People’s Republic. It follows, therefore, that international recognition of Taiwan’s de jure independence is a consummation that China’s leaders devoutly wish to avoid. By the same token, an American strategy to deny China that objective would complicate Beijing’s calculus and deter large-scale hostilities. For decades, China has cautioned “independence means war.” The opposite is also true: “war means independence.” A comprehensive strategy of denial would guarantee an outcome of de jure independence for Taiwan in the event of Chinese invasion or
A recent Taipei Times editorial (“A targeted bilingual policy,” March 12, page 8) questioned how the Ministry of Education can justify spending NT$151 million (US$4.74 million) when the spotlighted achievements are English speech competitions and campus tours. It is a fair question, but it focuses on the wrong issue. The problem is not last year’s outcomes failing to meet the bilingual education vision; the issue is that the ministry has abandoned the program that originally justified such a large expenditure. In the early years of Bilingual 2030, the ministry’s K-12 Administration promoted the Bilingual Instruction in Select Domains Program (部分領域課程雙語教學實施計畫).
Former Fijian prime minister Mahendra Chaudhry spoke at the Yushan Forum in Taipei on Monday, saying that while global conflicts were causing economic strife in the world, Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP) serves as a stabilizing force in the Indo-Pacific region and offers strategic opportunities for small island nations such as Fiji, as well as support in the fields of public health, education, renewable energy and agricultural technology. Taiwan does not have official diplomatic relations with Fiji, but it is one of the small island nations covered by the NSP. Chaudhry said that Fiji, as a sovereign nation, should support
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