The first batch of 38 new M1A2T Abrams tanks purchased from the US arrived in Taipei on Sunday. As with many of Taiwan’s previous military and arms purchases, the shipment of tanks was immediately criticized by biased “military experts,” who made sarcastic remarks about the tanks being “too large” or “unsuited to Taiwan’s terrain.”
The rationale behind the purchase lay in more than just the tanks’ tactical use; what is more important is the strategic value they demonstrate.
To establish deterrent power, Taiwan’s military resources have been for the most part concentrated on its navy and air force, including air defense and anti-ship missiles. In contrast, the army’s equipment — whether it be main battle tanks or gear for soldiers — has been largely secondary.
From an outside perspective, Taiwan’s homeland defense capabilities seem to primarily focus on the maritime and airspace regions around the nation. If the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were to successfully land in Taiwan, Taiwan’s army — with its limited resources — would struggle to resist, let alone defeat the invaders.
Furthermore, a lack of opportunities to use first-rate equipment might lead to an accumulated sense of deprivation that could affect the morale of Taiwan’s ground forces and military recruitment rates. That would make the implementation of a nationwide defense mobilization plan even more difficult. After all, when it comes to nationwide defense mobilization, even if the army is not the most important factor, it still plays a vital role.
The unique strategic value of the M1A2T purchase lies in two major points:
First, the tanks demonstrate Taiwan’s defensive determination.
Second, they would help prevent an excessive tilt in Taiwan’s military development, thus ensuring smoother coordination among the three military branches and ultimately aiding the implementation of nationwide defense mobilization.
Huang Wei-ping works in public service and has a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Massachusetts.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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