Just more than one year ago, China gave then-Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and his wife a warm welcome during their six-day visit to the country, offering the former Syrian leader a rare break from years of international isolation since the start of a civil war in 2011.
As the couple attended the Asian Games, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) vowed to support al-Assad in “opposing external interference” and in Syria’s rebuilding, while his wife Asma was feted in Chinese media.
However, the abrupt end to the rule of the authoritarian leader so explicitly backed by Xi only last year has dealt a blow to China’s diplomatic ambitions in the Middle East and exposed the limits of its strategy in the region, analysts said. A coalition of rebels seized Syria’s capital, Damascus, on Sunday last week after a lightning offensive that toppled al-Assad’s regime and ended his family’s 50-year dynasty.
“There’s been a lot of an exaggerated sense of China’s ability to shape political outcomes in the region,” Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow Jonathan Fulton said.
While the collapse of the al-Assad regime was seen reducing the influence in the Arab world of his main backers, Iran and Russia, it was also a blow for China’s global ambitions, Fulton said.
“A lot of what [China has] been doing internationally has relied on support with those countries, and their inability to prop up their biggest partner in the Middle East says quite a lot about their ability to do much beyond the region,” he said.
TACKLING HOTSPOTS
After China brokered a deal between long-time rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran last year, Chinese media praised Beijing’s rising profile in a neighborhood long dominated by Washington.
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅), China’s top diplomat, said the country would play a constructive role in handling global “hotspot issues.” China also brokered a truce between Fatah, Hamas and other rival Palestinian factions earlier this year, and has made repeated calls for a ceasefire in Gaza.
However, despite bringing Middle Eastern leaders to Beijing and rounds of “shuttle diplomacy” by Middle Eastern envoy Zhai Jun (翟雋), in the months since, Palestinians have not formed a unity government and the conflict in Gaza continues.
“Assad’s sudden downfall is not a scenario Beijing wishes to see,” Shanghai International Studies University Middle East scholar Fan Hongda (范鴻達) said. “China prefers a more stable and independent Middle East, as chaos or a pro-American orientation in the region does not align with China’s interests.”
The response by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to al-Assad’s fall has been muted; instead it is focusing on the safety of Chinese nationals and calling for a “political solution” to restore stability in Syria as soon as possible.
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Mao Ning (毛寧) on Monday appeared to leave an opening for engagement with the future government: “China’s friendly relations with Syria are for all Syrian people,” she said.
Chinese experts and diplomats said Beijing would now bide its time before recognizing a new government in Damascus.
It could use its expertise and financial muscle to support reconstruction, but its commitments are likely to be limited, because China has sought to minimize financial risks overseas in recent years, they said.
Syria joined China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative in 2022, but there have been no significant investments by Chinese firms since, partly due to sanctions.
China is “not really able to fundamentally replace the West either as an economic partner, or diplomatic or military force in the region,” said Bill Figueroa, assistant professor at the University of Groningen and an expert in China-Middle East relations.
“China in 2024 has way less money than China in 2013 to 2014, when the [Belt and Road Initiative] BRI was launched,” Figueroa said.
There is “an obvious reassessment going on in the direction of safer investments and reducing China’s risks overall,” he added.
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