The arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) represent an earthquake on the world’s legal landscape: the first time a Western ally from a modern democracy has been charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity by a global judicial body.
Inside Israel, the warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former defense minister Yoav Gallant would not have an immediate effect. In the short term, they are likely to rally support around the prime minister from a defiant Israeli public.
In the longer term, the enormity of the charges against Netanyahu and Gallant could grow heavier, shrinking the patch on the globe still open to them. The stigma of being an accused war criminal is a hard one to shrug off.
Yahya Sinwar and the other two Hamas suspects named by the ICC prosecutor have all been killed by Israel since May when the warrants were first requested, but the pretrial chamber at The Hague issued a warrant for one of them, the Hamas military commander Mohammed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri, also known as Mohammed Deif, on the grounds that his widely reported death, in an airstrike in July, has yet to be officially confirmed.
That looks like a formality and it is all but certain that none of the three Hamas leaders would stand trial for the massacres on Oct. 7 last year that ignited the Gaza war.
In the world as viewed from The Hague, the approval of warrants by the ICC judges would forever transform the court’s standing. The US — not an ICC member anyway — rejected the warrants, and said it would coordinate with its partners, Israel included, about the “next steps.”
Other Israeli allies, such as Germany, would distance themselves, but it would be a difficult moment for the administration of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, whose background is in human rights and international law. Washington is likely to lean on London to reject the validity of the warrants, but that would seriously damage UK credibility elsewhere in the world.
Amnesty International reminded Starmer of the importance of the UK’s support.
“The UK’s standing as a genuine supporter of the rule of law requires consistency and even-handedness,” it said.
Many countries who have hitherto seen the ICC as a tool of the Western world are likely to embrace the decision and the tribunal itself. While the UN Security Council has done little to mitigate the war in Gaza, the ICC would be widely seen, especially in the global south, as a more effective defender of the UN charter.
The question for Europe, in particular, is whether to have any dealings with Netanyahu on his turf in Israel. The European Council of Foreign Relations said that when former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta was the subject of an ICC warrant, European officials adopted a policy of avoiding nonessential contact.
“This set of arrest warrants are groundbreaking because, for the first time in the case of Israel, they involve a close ally of the ‘Western’ permanent members of the security council, which have so far been almost exempt from international judicial scrutiny,” said Iva Vukusic, an assistant professor in international history at Utrecht University. “Israel is considered by many as a functioning democracy with a capable judicial system, and a close ally to the West, and we have not so far seen an arrest warrant in such a situation.”
One thing the warrants are unlikely to do is topple Netanyahu — or even weaken him. That is critical, as many observers believe the war in Gaza is likely to continue for as long as he holds on to power.
“It will strengthen Netanyahu,” said Dahlia Scheindlin, an Israeli expert on international public opinion. “Israelis are absolutely rock-solid convinced that the international system in general basically exists in order to target and single out Israel unfairly. That kind of sentiment cuts across the board in the Jewish community.”
That means few Israelis see the warrants as evidence that Netanyahu is weakening their country on the global scale, driving it towards pariah status. If anything, the prime minister’s many critics would pause their litany of complaints against him for long enough to reject the jurisdiction of a foreign court over their affairs.
In terms of the next Israeli elections, due by October 2026 and a critical moment for Israel and the region, ICC warrants are unlikely to change many votes. However, the sting they leave would be more likely to make itself felt over the years and decades to come.
There would be a long list of countries that are members of the ICC that Netanyahu and Gallant would be unable to visit, as they would be obliged to act on the arrest warrant.
The US, Russia and China are not members, but for the current White House at least, a visit by either man would be highly embarrassing — although though the incoming administration of US president-elect Donald Trump would be another matter.
“The ICC plays a long game,” Vukusic said. “Once issued, warrants follow you pretty much until you’re dead. If, upon the issuing of the warrants, Netanyahu again goes to the US to speak to Congress, for example, it at least massively embarrasses the US and makes their hypocrisy so plain to see.”
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