Taiwan hosted the third edition of the Taiwan-India dialogue on Nov. 14. The dialogue, jointly hosted by the Taipei-based Taiwan Asia Exchange Foundation and India’s premier think tank, the Observer Research Foundation, has evolved into an important platform for policy-oriented discussions.
Although it was a think-tank-level discussion with limited official participation from both sides, such platforms are crucial given Taiwan’s diplomatic constraints.
In the absence of direct political interactions, such forums have become vital channels for advancing the nation’s global standing, understanding the interests of other countries, and conveying Taiwan’s policies and priorities.
India is undoubtedly a key partner for Taiwan across multiple fronts, a sentiment often echoed in Taiwan. However, there is a clear lack of sustained engagement to fully capitalize on this relationship. While Taiwan might rightfully seek greater reciprocity from India, it is crucial to appreciate the progress made and build on it. India’s traditionally cautious approach, shaped by its careful balancing act with China, requires a nuanced understanding. Therefore, Taiwan must recognize the importance of gradual progress and strategically foster deeper relations, even if the pace and response are slower than desired.
Taiwan and India should let their relationship evolve organically, with Taipei perhaps needing to reaffirm its commitment to deeper engagement with New Delhi. A foremost challenge lies in the limited understanding of India within Taiwan, where the country is often viewed through a Western perspective. However, India must be understood through its own lens. Establishing India centers in universities and think tanks in Taiwan would be a vital step toward advancing mutual understanding.
Taipei’s successful lobbying efforts in Washington, which have earned bipartisan support, provide a model that could potentially be replicated in New Delhi.
However, there is a lack of lobbying efforts despite Taiwan’s substantial presence in India through its three representative offices, four Taiwan External Trade Development Council offices, a tourism bureau in Mumbai — temporarily closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and yet to be reopened — and various chambers of commerce.
This gap in outreach is critical, especially as China is actively working to shape narratives around Taiwan-India relations and India-China ties. It has become common for China to invite bloggers, influencers, journalists and academics to sway public opinion in India. Taiwan must bolster its efforts in this area to promote a more positive image of its relationship with New Delhi.
However, the absence of direct flights between the two countries is a major obstacle. The failure to prioritize the resumption of direct connectivity is shortsighted. It takes more than 12 hours to travel from New Delhi to Taipei by connecting flights, whereas a direct flight would reduce this time by more than half. Resuming direct flights would not only boost tourism, but could also significantly contribute to Taiwan’s standing on the global tourism map. With Taiwan missing a potential influx of Indian tourists, neighboring Southeast Asian countries and Europe are benefiting from it.
India, for its part, must maintain its stance, continuing to engage with Taiwan on its own merits, disentangled from the relationship with China. Compromising on this engagement would undermine India’s economic and strategic interests, especially in sectors such as semiconductor technology and trade.
With the uncertainty surrounding ‘Trump 2.0,’ the second administration of US president-elect Donald Trump, occasional shakeups in global politics are inevitable. While Taiwan would remain important to the US, some US allies and like-minded countries are recalibrating their policies, focusing on self-sufficiency and diversifying their partnerships. This evolving landscape raises a critical question: Where does Taiwan fit into this dynamic? India, undeniably, plays a pivotal role in Taiwan’s future strategy. Many Asian countries are moving away from the belief that the Western alliance would guarantee their security, and Taiwan’s own security concerns are becoming more pressing. Relying too heavily on the West could be counterproductive, and now is the time for Taiwan to embrace greater self-sufficiency and strengthen partnerships with like-minded Asian countries — India should be at the forefront of this shift.
No one seeks direct confrontation with China, but many countries, including India and Japan, are working to deter its increasingly aggressive postures. Taiwan, too, must align itself with this approach. As the US strengthens its outreach to India, Taipei should seize the opportunity to deepen its own engagement with New Delhi. Over the coming years, we are likely to see more discussions about burden-sharing and collective security, and India would be an important player in this evolving discourse.
To strengthen ties with India, Taipei must advance cooperation across trade, technology, education and people-to-people exchanges. By raising the stakes in these areas, Taiwan can increase India’s stakes in the country, which, in turn, would build New Delhi’s willingness to support Taipei in safeguarding the Taiwan Strait. There are no shortcuts — the only way forward is consistency, patience and a commitment to mutual benefit. That is the recipe for lasting cooperation in Taiwan-India relations.
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