Estonia is one of the bravest European countries when it comes to standing up against Russian authoritarianism and its imperialistic design applied in Ukraine and beyond. It is no coincidence that former Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas, a staunch supporter of Ukraine’s struggle for self-defense against Russian invasion, has been designated as the new high representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy.
As regards to China, the Baltic country’s posture toward Beijing took a turn when the latter decided not to put any limits on its strategic partnership with Moscow, even if it meant to risk angering economic and commercial partners within the EU.
As a consequence of China’s agenda in the Russia-Ukraine war, Estonia (and Latvia) quit China’s 17+1 diplomatic forum, a club aimed at strengthening Beijing’s relations with central and eastern European countries.
While the Estonian government’s statement did not mention Beijing-Moscow relations, it is clear that it was the main reason behind the decision not to engage with China in “a more friendly way.”
Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal’s priority is to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, Kallas, by striving for a pragmatic relationship with China based on pursuing economic gains, as well as on standing up for the respect of human rights and the international rules-based order.
Estonia-Taiwan relations should advance on the basis of mutual trust, deeply shared values and awareness of the challenges stemming from like-minded authoritarian countries.
In that sense, Taiwan can help Estonia tackle Russia’s hybrid threat tactics by sharing its expertise in dealing with China’s “digital warfare” consisting of cybersecurity threats, information manipulation and interference activities.
As Moscow and Beijing become further aligned in their shared efforts to “create a multipolar order,” where the existing rules’ respect is to be questioned, China’s “economic expansion” and “malign interference activities” should lead to a deeper engagement between Estonia and Taiwan.
In particular, as Europe is concerned of China’s investments in critical infrastructures, Tallinn should confront the risks of Bejing’s economic coercion by exploiting the opportunities stemming from an expanded relationship with like-minded countries such as Taiwan.
Regarding Russia’s digital warfare, Taipei’s model of resilience can prove beneficial in providing a strong expertise for developing strategies adjusted to local specificities. Greater coordination between democratic countries would also act as a countermeasure to authoritarian threats.
As regards to unofficial diplomatic relations, in November last year the Estonian government reviewed its approach to Taiwan to allow the opening of a Taiwanese representative office in Estonia. As it is one of the few Nordic and Baltic countries without Taiwanese representation, the move might be the cornerstone of a new Tallinn policy toward Taipei.
With negotiations are ongoing to achieve this purpose, at the beginning of this month, Estonian Riigikogu Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Marko Mihkelson led a delegation of the committee to Taipei. The visit, the first ever in Estonia-Taiwan relations, underscores the closer ties between the two sides.
“When looking at the relations between Estonia and Taiwan in recent years, it can be seen that cooperation has become considerably close at various levels,” Mihkelson said.
It is further evidenced by the delegation’s meeting with Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫).
As Estonia’s relationship with Taiwan gradually intensifies, it is important to note the areas of potential collaboration not exploited yet by the two sides. In particular, in addition to the establishment of a Taiwanese representative office in Estonia, the two countries should strengthen their semiconductor partnership to boost production and Taiwan’s investments in Europe.
Taiwan could provide licenses for semiconductor manufacturing, along with training for Estonian workers. Taking into account the developments regarding Lithuania-Taiwan relations, particularly as regards to their semiconductor partnership, a deeper understanding between parties could be the key to turning point in the relationship.
China’s refusal to play a role in ending Russia’s war in Ukraine made Estonia, as well as other central and European countries, more aware of the growing political bond between Moscow and Beijing. It is imperative to better understand the nature of the threat they pose together.
Allowing Taiwan to be known as the strong ally it represents would help increase Estonians’ sympathy toward Taipei and solidify the “alliance of hope” opposed to the increasingly authoritarian Russian-Chinese front aimed at undermining the international order.
Michele Maresca is an analyst at the online international law journal Il Caffe Geopolitico.
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